Investigation of the Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality, Type A Mishap by Bennardo, C. P. et al.
General Disclaimer 
One or more of the Following Statements may affect this Document 
 
 This document has been reproduced from the best copy furnished by the 
organizational source. It is being released in the interest of making available as 
much information as possible. 
 
 This document may contain data, which exceeds the sheet parameters. It was 
furnished in this condition by the organizational source and is the best copy 
available. 
 
 This document may contain tone-on-tone or color graphs, charts and/or pictures, 
which have been reproduced in black and white. 
 
 This document is paginated as submitted by the original source. 
 
 Portions of this document are not fully legible due to the historical nature of some 
of the material. However, it is the best reproduction available from the original 
submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Produced by the NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI) 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130012597 2019-08-31T00:53:27+00:00Z
Investigation of the 
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type A Mishap 
Mishap Report

May 2006
Mishap Report 
May 2006 
CONTENTS 
FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................... 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....................................................................................................iv 
E)UCUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... v 
1. CHARTER AND RESPONSE ...................................................................................... 1 
	
1.1	 Transmittal Letter ...................................................................................................1 
	
1.2	 Appointment Letters................................................................................................2 
	
1.3	 Signatures Pages ......................................................................................................7 
2. MISHAP DESCRIPTION .......................................... . ................................................ 10 
	
2.1	 Summary ..................................... . .......................................................................... 10 
	
2.2	 General Events Before the Mishap ................................................ ....................... 10 
	
2.3	 Specific Events of the Day of the Mishap.............................................................11 
	
2.4	 Emergency Response.............................................................................................16 
	
2.5	 Events After the Mishap ....................................................................... . ................. 17 
3. INVESTIGATION......................................................................................................18 
	
3.1	 Approach ................................................................................................................18 
	
3.2	 Chronology of Mishap Investigation .......... .......................................................... 18 
	
3.3	 Data Collection and Development ........................................ . ............................... 19 
	
3.4	 Analysis...................................................................................................................21 
4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 47 
	
4.1	 Proximate Causes...................................................................................................47 
	
4.2	 Root Causes and Recommendations ....................................................................47 
	
4.3	 Contributing Factors ............................................................................................. 50 
	
4.4	 Failed Barriers.......................................................................................................52 
	
4.5	 Other Significant Observations and Recommendations..................................... 
APPENDIX A.
	 REFERENCES........................................................................................57 
APPENDIX B.	 DEFINITIONS.........................................................................................59 
APPENDIX C.
	 ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SYMBOLS...........................61.

APPENDIX I). OSHA'S FORM 301 COMPLETED FOR THE BUILDING 
M6-794 ROOFING FATALITY.............................................................63 
APPENDIX E.
	 INTERIM SAFETY ALERT .................................................................. 65 
APPENDIX F. 	 EVENT & CAUSAL-FACTOR TREE (RELEX)..................................67
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type A Mishap
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Plan (Bird's Eye) View of Northeast Corner of Building M6-794 (Mishap Location)......................................................................................12 
Figure2. Mishap Site.................................................................................................13 
Figure 3. Close-up View of Leading Edge of Roof at Point Where the 
DeceasedFell..............................................................................................14 
Figure 4. View of Mishap Location From Roof........................................................15 
Figure 5. Location of Mishap Witness Relative to Mishap Site...............................16 
Figure 6. Proximate Causes of Fatality.....................................................................22 
Figure 7. Events Leading to the Deceased's Working Close to the Edge of 
the Roof Without Proper Fall Protection..................................................23 
Figure 8. Root Causes of Oneida Misclassifying the Work as Low-Sloped 
Roofing Instead of Steel Erection .............................................................. 25 
Figure 9. Violations Contributing to Superintendent's Failure To Use 
the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System Correctly....................26 
Figure 10. Root Causes of and Observations Regarding Warning Line 
Violation.....................................................................................................27 
Figure 11. Factors Contributing to and Observation Regarding the 
SafetyMonitor Violation ...........................................................................29 
Figure 12. Events Leading to the Failure of the Deceased To Use 
PhysicalRestraints ..................................................................................... .11 
Figure 13. Events Leading to the Superintendent's Decision Not To Erect 
Scaffolding.................................................................................................. .12 
Figure 14. Events Leading to the Unavailability of Anchorage Points ...................... .13 
Figure 15. Events Leading to Use of the Warning Line and Safety 
MonitoringSystem...................................................................................... 
Figure 16. Events Leading to the Deceased's Loss of Balance ................................... 37
I*1 
Mishap Report 
May 2006 
FOREWORD 
The Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality Mishap Investigation Board (Board) was commissioned 
to gather information; analyze the facts; identify the proximate causes, root causes, and 
contributing factors relating to the mishap; and recommend appropriate actions to prevent a 
similar mishap from occurring in the future. During the investigation of this mishap, the Board 
also examined the fall protection policies of other NASA Centers and operating locations to gain 
an understanding of how those entities conduct fall protection, as well as the degree to which fall 
protection is standardized across the Agency.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Mishap 
On March 17, 2006, at approximately 1325 EST, a construction worker fell from the roof of 
Supply Warehouse #1 (Building M6-794) in the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Industrial Area. 
Rescue personnel arrived at the mishap scene minutes later, and the worker was subsequently 
airlifted to the Orlando Regional Medical Center. lie died 1606 EST that same day as a result of 
head injuries. The deceased and other roof workers involved were all employed by Oneida 
Construction, Inc. At the dme of the mishap, the workers were installing a corrugated metal 
roofing panel as part of Subcontract X04524-6, awarded to Oneida through the Space Gateway 
Support, LLC (SGS), Subcontracts Administration Office. 
Based on a mishap site visit, interviews, and data analysis, the Mishap Investigation Board 
(Board) identified the underlying causes of the mishap. Event and causal-factor tree diagrams 
were developed, resulting in the identification of proximate (or direct) causes and root causes of 
the mishap. 
Proximate Causes 
Two proximate causes of this fatality were identified. If either of these were eliminated or 
modified, this mishap would not have occurred. 
Proximate Cause 1: The deceased was working close to the edge of a roof (17 
feet above the ground) without proper fall protection. The roofing work 
should have been classified as steel erection, for which the Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration (OSHA) required physical restraints. However, Oneida 
and SGS misclassified the roof work as low-sloped roofing, which did not require 
physical restraints. For low-sloped roofing work, OSHA allowed use of a 
Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System in lieu of physical restraints. A 
warning line was not used and the safety monitor was helping the other workers 
instead of acting solely as a safety monitor; both were violations of OSHA 
regulations for proper fall protection. 
• Contributing Factor (CoF-1): Superintendent helped move the roofing Panel 
while acting as the safety monitor. 
• Contributing Factor (CoF-2): Superintendent did not stop the job and seek 
additional personnel when two workers were not sufficient. 
• Contributing Factor (CoF-3): Temporary anchorage points were not 
required by OSHA, NASA, KSC, or contractors. 
Proximate Cause 2: The deceased fell from the roof. Evidence shows that the 
deceased either tripped or stumbled prior to falling off the roof, rather than 
stepped off the roof. The two most likely tripping hazards were the lightning
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protection wire (located approximately 6 inches from the edge of the roof) and the 
uneven working surface of the corrugated roof. 
Contributing Factor (CoF-4): While not legally intoxicated under Florida's 
Driving Standard, the deceased was under the influence of alcohol and tested 
positive for marijuana. 
Root Causes and Recommendations 
Subsection 4.2 of this report contains recommendations related to root causes that, if followed, 
should prevent similar mishaps from occurring in the future. The root causes and 
recommendations were as follows: 
Root Cause 1: Oneida was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work as 
steel erection (RCI), which required a physical restraint instead of the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System. 
Recommendation (RCI-1): When responding to a Request for Proposal (RFP) and 
prior to preparing a safety plan, subcontractors should review OSHA regulations and 
letters of Standard Interpretation to properly classify the work. 
When roofing jobs are performed, subcontractors are responsible for 
determining the applicability of 29 CFR 1926.501 (low-sloped roof) and 29 
CFR 1926.750 (steel erection) in accordance with OSHA Standards and letters 
of Standard Interpretation. 
Contract language should include information alerting subcontractors that the 
OSHA Area Office has a compliance assistance specialist available as a 
resource. 
Root Cause 2: SGS was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work as steel 
erection (RC2). 
Recommendation (RC2-1): Prior to issuing an RPP, the prime contractor should 
review OSHA Standards and letters of Standard Interpretations to properly classify 
work. 
Recommendation (RC2-2): NASA/KSC and prime contractors should review 
current ongoing work involving roofing to ensure proper work classification and 
compliance with OSHA Standards and letters of Standard Interpretation. 
Root Cause 3: Oneida did not ensure its superintendent's compliance with the OSHA 
requirement for fall protection (RC3). Although SGS had previously written up the 
superintendent for warnin g line and safety monitor noncompliances. the Board had no evidence 
that these noncompliances were ever presented to the Oneida owner/president. 
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Recommendation (RC3-1): Prime contractors should develop a mechanism to 
ensure that OSHA noncompliances immediately dangerous to life and health are 
reported to the subcontractor president/lop management. 
Root Cause 4: SGS did not ensure Oneida's compliance with the OSHA requirement for 
fall protection (RC4). Although SOS had previously written up the superintendent for warning 
line and safety monitor noncompliances, the noncornpliances were corrected on the spot and no 
further retraining, corrective action, or disciplinary action was taken by Oneida toward the 
superintendent or by SOS toward Oneida. 
Recommendation (RC4-1): SGS should develop a mechanism to ensure that OSHA 
noncompliances immediately dangerous to life and health are reported to the 
subcontractor president/top management. 
•	 Other prime contractors (e.g., United Space Alliance and Boeing) should 
develop a similar mechanism to ensure that OSHA noncompliances 
immediately dangerous to life and health are reported to the subcontractor 
president/top management. 
For construction contracts that NASAJKSC issues, NASAJKSC should 
develop a similar mechanism to ensure that OSHA noncompliances 
immediately dangerous to life and health are reported to the contractor 
president/top management. 
Recommendation (RC4-2): Prime contractor safety specialists should trend 
noncompliances and discuss them at the appropriate contractor/subcontractor safety 
meeting. 
Recommendation (RC4-3): For construction contracts that NASA!KSC issues, 
NASA/KSC should trend noucomptiances and discuss them at the appropriate 
contractor safety meeting. 
Root Cause 5: NASA/KSC fall protection practices follow the OSHA-defined standards for 
low-sloped roofs, which allow the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System rather than 
requiring a physical-restraint system (RC5). 
Recommendation (RCS-1): NASA!KSC should develop and implement a fall 
protection policy and program for low-sloped roofing work that is more stringent than 
the applicable OS-HA standard and requires the use of physical restraints when 
working within 6 feet of the edge. The use of warning lines and safety monitors or 
other nonphysicat-restraint systems should be reserved for special circumstances after 
review and approval through a NASAJKSC formalized variance process. 
Recommendation (RCS-2): A Centerwide fall protection team (civil servants and 
contractors) should he formed to examine issues (e.g., standardization across 
contractors, variance processing, retrofitting of existing facilities) arising from the 
implementation of a new, more stringent fall protection policy and program.
vu
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Other Significant Observations 
The significant observations are in subsection 4.5 and fell into several groupings: 
Training and Documentation: 
•	 Observation (0-1): Oneida did not maintain a current list of employees who 
were working on the job site. 
•	 Observation (0-2): Oneida did not conduct, or did not document, all weekly 
safety meetings. 
•	 Observation (0-3): Oneida provided no evidence that either the deceased or the 
other Oneida worker was trained by a competent person qualified in 29 CFR 
1926, Subpart M, Fall Protection. Therefore, the training of the deceased and the 
other Oneida worker was deficient. 
•	 Observation (0-4): The training certification provided by Oneida was not signed 
by the trainer or the employer, so it was in technical violation of 29 CFR 
1926.503(b)(1). 
•	 Observation (0-5): While KSC fall protection training was, for the most part, 
adequate for construction workers, it was insufficient for specialized training for 
competent or qualified persons and inspector training. 
Communication: 
Observation (0-6): Contractors and subcontractors were not required to inform 
NASA of all on-Center worksite OSHA noncompliances. 
Observation (0-7: Inadequate coordination within SGS resulted in Oneida 
working without the knowledge of SGS Safety. 
Fall Policy:
Observation (0-8): Permanent anchorage points were not added anytime after 
the initial construction of Building M6-794, and KSC policy did not require their 
installation. 
Observation (0-9): Other than OSHA minimum standards, no single, 
standardized fall protection policy exists across all NASA Centers or operating 
locations. 
Other:
Observation (0-10): Drug and alcohol testing was not performed on Oneida 
workers involved in the mishap. 
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Observation (0-11): Contract clause flowdown to the subcontractor was not a 
contributing factor to the mishap. 
Observation (0-12): Behaviors identified in mishaps can be used to study and 
improve the KSC safety culture.
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INVESTIGATION OF THE

BUILDING M6 .794 ROOFING FATALITY

TYPE A MISHAP 
	
1.	 cllAwrER AND RESPONSE 
	
1.1	 Transmittal Letter
I ConimeritIMl]: Dcbbycany, 
make this a firft hUger? (LowPtidtity) 
Nsflmal AOtonaucs and 
Space Adrrftsiruthjn 
John f.KarrtodySpaesc.rtta, 
Kennedy Space Carder, R- 32090
May 11, 2006 
SA 
TO:	 AA/Director 
FROM:	 Chnimrnrt, M6-0794 Roofing Fatality Mishap Investigation Board 
SUBJECT: Final Report for Building M60794 Roofing Fatality 
Reference your letter dated March 24,2006, which established the Mishap Investigation 
Roard for Wilding M6-0794 Roofing Fatality, March 17.2006, and defined the 
Board's rvrponsib!Jhics. 
The investigation was conducted in accordance with NPR 8621 .IA, "NASA Procedural 
Requiranients for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Rsrporling." The final report of the 
Mishap Investigation Board's activities, findings, and recommendations is submitted 
and cnctoscd. 
70in 
It 
Casper 
2 Enclosures 
I. Written Report 
2. Electronic Files ofWrinen Report
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1.2	 Appointment Letters 
The original appointment letter and a subsequent revision memorandum are included here for 
reference.
Nat$caJ MrOcrSUtlCS and 
Spaca iStTat-Cfl C John F. Koastdy Spate Center Ki;nr*4 Space Center FL 269
March 24, 2006 
r.5 ,r SA 
TO:	 Distribution 
FROM:
	
AA/Director 
SUBJECT: Mishap investigation Board (MIII) for Building M6-0794 Rooting Fatality, 
March 17, 2006 
This memorandum, in sccordance with NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8621. IA. 
"NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkccptng." 
establishes the Building M6-0794 Roofing Fatality MEB and sets forth its responsibilities and 
membership. The chairperson and members of the Board are listed in the enclosure. 
In accordance with the NPR, tam establishing the Building M60794 Rooting Fatality MIB to 
gather information; analyze the facts; idccii(y the protcisnate c5u5e(s), soot cause(s), and 
contributing factors relating to the mishap; and to recommend appropriate actions to prevent a 
similar mishap from occurring again. 
The Chairperson of the Board will report to me on all aspects regarding this investigation. 
The Board will: 
Obtain and analyze whatever evidence, facts, and opinions it considers relevant. 
• Conduct tests and any other activity it deems appropriate. 
• Interview witnesses and receive statements from witnesses. 
• impound property, equipment, and records as considered necessary. 
• Determine the proximate cause(s), root cause(s), and contributing factors relating lo the 
mishap. 
• Develop reconiurendations to prevent similar mishaps, 
• Provide a final written report that will con form to all requirements in NPR 802 1.1. 
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The Chairperson will: 
• Conduct Board activities in accordance with the requirements in NPR 8621.1. 
• Establish and document, as necansaLy, Mes and procedures for organizing and 
operating the Board, including any subgroups, and for the format and content of oral or 
written reports to and by the Board. 
• Designate any additional representatives, advisors, consultants, experts, liaison officers, 
or other individuals who may be required to support the activities of the Board and 
define the duties and responsibilities of those persons. 
• t)esigatc another voting member of the Board to act as chairperson in his or her 
absence. 
Document n edtt&5 and retain records 
The Board will convene starting the week of March 20, 2006, and will provide a final report 
within 75 workdays. 
I will dismiss the Board when it has fulfilled its requirements. 
4Jan1e5 W. Kennedy 
Enclosure 
Distribution: 
Sec page 3
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Mishap Investigation Board 
for thc
Building M6.0794 Roofing Fatality
Mishap Dale: March Il, 2006 
The following individuals arc the voting members of the NUB: 
John Casper MO (Johnson Spaco Cvntct)
i. 
Chahierson-Member 
C. P. Bennardo DX-O Member 
David Tipton TA-C2 Occupational Health 
Physician-Member 
Damy Miller [j $A-B] Human Factors.Mensbcr 
Kxistie French QD50 (Marshall Space Flight 
Center)
Safety-Member 
flie following individual will serve as the Lx Officio on the M113, and complete applicable 
tasks as outlined in NPR 5621.1: 
I Facemnire. l)avjd 	 SA-E2	 I Lx Officio 
The following Individuals are considered support staff to the Mishap Investigation Board: 
Steven Horn
.' 
CC Legal Adviser - 
Bruce Buckingham I XA-E Public Affa i rs Advisor 
Mitch Colvin OP-MS NASA Contracts Advisor
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Natal Aern,autics &id 
Space ACth5flt9Ira5ofl 
John F. Kennedy Sprca Center 
Kennedy Space Cent FL 32M
March 28, 2006 
SA 
TO:	 HQ/Chkf Safety and Mission Assurance Officer 
AA/Director 
FROM:	 SAiChairrnsn, M6-04 Roofing Fatality Mishap Investigation Board (MID) 
SUBJECT: Appointment of Additional Mill Representative 
Reference:	 Original Appointment Letter MIII fbr M6-074 Roofing 
Petality, March 17,2006 
Effective this date, the bIIowtng person is appointad Advisor to the M6 .0794 Roofing 
Fatality MIS: 
dame---	 r%iani2atiofl Resnonsiffitv on Board 
Michael JiWet	 JSC OSMA	 AdvisOr 
Jo 11. Caper
cc: 
CC/S- Horn SA-E2/D. Facernire 
DX-G/P, Bennaxdc TA-C2/D. Tipton 
OP-MS/M. Colvin XA-E/B. Buckingham 
SA-AI/M. Cherry HQ/Offlce of Safety and Mission Assurance/Safety and 
SA-BI/D. Miller Assurance Requirements Division,?. Chandler 
$A-M. Preston JSC/NA/M. HuM 
SA-1321D. Barker MSFC/QDSQFK. French 
SA-E21J. Brand PAFB145SW/SEO/C. Olesneich 
SA-E2/T. Dwyer
h'l 
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Nationai At3ronautIC8 and 
Space Arè,iatrat}on C John F. Kennedy Space Center Kennedy Space Comer, FL 32899
April 19, 2006 
SA 
Scott Hampton 
Senior Stnichirat Engineer 
Space Gateway Support 
Mail Code: SOS-] 27 
Kennedy Space Center, FL 3289 
Dear Mr. Hainpon: 
In accordance with NASA Procedural Raquiremenxs (NI'R) 9621.IA, NASA Procedural 
Requirements for Mishap Reporting, Investigation, end Rcutxdkccplflg, and the Kennedy 
Space Center Director's tenet dated Match 24,2006, you are hereby appointed as a consultant 
to the M6-0794 Roofing Fatality Mishap Investigation Board (MID). 
As a consultant to the MIB, you may be called upon to gather information, provide advice, 
perform analysis, and assht In formulating conclusions. Your role shall not include 
participating in deliboralione; voting on findings; signing the mishap report', or reading, 
listening to, or parlicipnthig in witness interviews. 
Casper 
Chairman 
M6-0794 Roofing Fatality Mishap Inveatigaflon Board 
IIQ/CbiefSaftly and Mission Assurance OfficerfB. O'Connor 
EQ/Office of Safety and Mission Assurance/Safety and Asnasnec Division/F. Chandler 
.tSC/NA/M. Hulet 
MSFC/QD50JK. French
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1.3	 Signatures Pages 
Concurrence by Board Members: 
John H. Casper 
Chairperson 
MG/Johnson Space Center 
Kristie French 
Deputy Chairperson 
Voting Member, Safety 
QD50/Marsha!1 Space Flight Center 
David A. Tipton 
Voting Member, Occupational Health 
Physician 
TA-C2/Kennedy Space Center 
Concurrence by Ex-Officio Board 
Member: 
David L. Faceinire, Safety 
SA-E2/Kennedy Space Center
C.P. i3ennardo 
Voting Member, Engineering 
DX-GlKennedy Space Center 
Darcy H. Miller 
Voting Member, Human Factors 
SAB 1/Kennedy Space Center
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Michael W. Hulet, Safety 
NA/Johnson Space Center
Steven G. Horn, Legal 
CC/Kennedy Space Center 
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OP-MS/Kennedy Space Center
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The Board's consultants were 
Charles D. Barker, Safety

SA-E2/Kennedy Space Center 
John D. Brand, Safety

SA-E2fKennedy Space Center 
Thomas P. Dwyer, Safety

SA-E2/Kennedy Space Center 
Robert A. Preston, Safety

SA-E2/Kennedy Space Center 
Scott Hampton, SGS Mishap Board

Space Gateway Support 
The Board's observer was 
Chris Olesnevich, Safety

45th Space Wing

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

Patrick Air Force Base
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2.	 MISHAP DESCRIPTION 
	
2.1	 Summary 
On March 17, 2006, at approximately 1325 (all times are Eastern Standard Time [ESTI), a 
construction worker fell from the roof of Supply Warehouse #1 (Building M6-794).in the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Industrial Area. Rescue personnel arrived at the mishap scene 
minutes later, and the worker was eventually airlifted to the Orlando Regional Medical Center 
(ORMC). He died later that same day, as a result of head injuries sustained during the fall. The 
workers were all employed by Oneida Construction, Inc. At the time of the mishap, the deceased 
and two other Oneida employees were installing a corrugated metal roofing panel on the 
northeast corner of the roof. This work was being performed as part of Subcontract X04524-6, 
awarded to Oneida through the Space Gateway Support, LLC (SGS), Subcontracts 
Administration Office. 
	
2.2	 General Events Before the Mishap 
Building M6-794, built in 1965, is a warehouse located in the KSC Industrial Area used to store 
Boeing flight equipment. On September 15, 2005, Subcontract X04524-6 was awarded to Oneida 
Construction, Inc., through the SGS Subcontracts Administration Office, to make repairs to the 
existing M6-794 metal roofing system. The roof of Building M6-794 has a slope of 2:12 (vertical 
rise:horizontal distance), which falls under OSHA's definition of a low-sloped roof (OSHA 29 
CFR 1926.500(b)). (The roofing work was misclassified as low-sloped roofing but should have 
been classified as "steel erection" because replacement of metal roof panels is steel erection as 
covered by 29 CFR 1926.750(b)(1)). The edge of the roof is approximately 17 feet (ft) above the 
surrounding concrete loading dock and 10 ft above an air-handling unit near the northeast corner 
of the building. 
A limited Notice to Proceed was issued at a prework conference held on September 15, 2005, 
which allowed the contractor to begin ordering materials. 
Oneida submitted a safety plan that addressed fall protection and worker training and 
certification on September 19, 2005. This plan was approved by the SGS Safety, Health, and 
Training Office on September 23, 2005. Full Notice to Proceed was also issued on September 23, 
2005. Oneida initially delivered materials to the job site on November 11, 2005, and began actual 
site work (replacement of roofing panel fasteners) on November 14, 2005. 
Sometime after site work began, technical questions arose regarding fasteners used to secure the 
metal panels to the roof, and Oneida submitted a Request for Information (RFI) to SGS. All Site 
work stopped on December 12, 2005, because this RH was still unresolved when SGS officially 
issued a Stop Work Letter. 
Answers to the fastener-related technical questions submitted by Oneida were eventually 
provided by SOS, and on March 15, 2006, the SOS subcontract administrator gave verbal 
direction to Oneida to resume site work. 
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During the morning of March 16, 2005, at a regularly scheduled weekly safety meeting, Oneida 
gave its employees a safety briefing, using materials from the KSC Safety Standdown. (The KSC 
Safety Standdown was planned to occur later that same day.) 
2.3	 Specific Events of the Day of the Mishap 
On March 17, 2006, at approximately 0800, a crew of three (two workers and a superintendent) 
employed by Oneida arrived at Building M6-794 to resume work on the roof. This was the first 
time Oneida had been on this job site in several weeks. An informal work discussion was held, 
and there was a delay in the actual start of the work while the crew waited for an aerial lift to be 
delivered to the job site. The aerial lift was needed to safely transport materials to the roof and 
accomplish some of the roofing panel installations. 
At approximately 1015, the aerial lift arrived and the crew began replacing three sheet metal 
roofing panels. Initially they replaced a panel on the northwest corner of the roof, with two of the 
three crew members working from the aerial lift, and one crew member working from the r6of. 
Next they began replacing a panel on the southeast corner. This work was performed with all 
three crew members working from the roof because an existing parapet wail that projected 37 
inches above the surface of the roof interfered with the use of the aerial lift. While they worked 
from the roof, the only means of fall protection used by the crew was the Safety Monitoring 
System. According to OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502(h)(1)(ii), safety monitors are intended to warn 
the employee when it appears that the employee is unaware of a fall hazard or is acting in an 
unsafe manner. According to OSHA 29 CFR 1926-501 (b)(10), safety monitoring alone is 
allowed without a Warning Line System on roofs less than 50 ft wide; however, the roof of 
Building M6-794 is wirier than 50 ft. At that time, the superintendent also assumed the role of 
safety monitor. The second panel was replaced before lunch, except for installing a few 
remaining fasteners. 
The crew stopped work for lunch, and Workers I (deceased) and 2 left the job site. The 
superintendent did not accompany the two workers. At approximately 1310, the same crew of 
three returned to the job site and resumed work. The crew finished installing the remaining 
fasteners on the second roofing panel (southeast corner of the roof) and then began installing a 
third (final) metal roofing panel. This third panel was located on the northeast corner of the roof, 
adjacent to the edge. Work on this third panel was also performed from the roof because of 
limited access by the aerial lift. The superintendent determined that interference with existing 
railroad tracks and an air-conditioning unit would preclude use of the aerial lift platform to 
replace this third panel and that the crew would continue to work on the roof using the Safety 
Monitoring System as their only means of fall protection. While working on the northeast corner 
of the roof, the superintendent continued in his secondary role as safety monitor. In addition to 
the dual roles of superintendent and safety monitor, this individual was also actively involved in 
replacing the third roofing panel, in direct violation of OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502(h)(1)(v) 
requirements. The crew encountered some interference between the third roofing panel and an 
existing lightning protection wire, which ran approximately 6 inches from the roof leading edge. 
As a result, the superintendent unsecured a portion of this wire from its existing roof guide 
brackets (to facilitate removal and replacement of the final panel). During installation of the final 
panel, Worker 2 lifted the edge of an existing panel to allow the new panel to be slid underneath. 
The superintendent/safety monitor and Worker 1 moved to the new panel, which was lying
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parallel to the roof edge. The superintendent/safety monitor (Worker 3) then picked up the uphill 
end of the new panel, while Worker 1 (deceased) picked up the downhill end. Together they 
began to carry the new panel into its final position, rotating it perpendicular to the roof edge. 
Worker I was located closest to the leading edge of the roof and walked with the panel toward 
the edge, while the superintendent/safety monitor acted as a pivot point, holding his end of the 
panel (see Figure 1).
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Just Prior To Mishap -.-_
	 Wire -
	
Rain Gutter 
Unsecured -
- Lightning 
Pr1ctk)rt
New Roofing Wire Penal 
(Location 
/ At Time Of Mishap) 
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Figure I.	 Plan (Bird's Eye) View of Northeast Corner of Building M6-794 (Mishap Location) 
At approximately 1325, Worker 1 lost his footing, let go of the new roofing panel, and fell from 
the roof. He fell backward approximately 10 ft, his head struck an air-conditioning unit, and he 
then fell an additional 7 ft to a concrete loading dock. 
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The lightning protection wire was unsecured at the edge of the roof and posed a tripping ha7ard. 
The Board could not determine with certainty whether Worker I tripped on the lightning 
protection Wife or on Something else (e.d., cornigatons in the rooting panels), or if he stumbled 
and the lightning protection wire prevented him from regaining his balance and he subsequently 
fell from the roof. 
Details of the mishap scene are shown in Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 
Location Where Deeesed 
Fell From loot 
t:	 -1
I	 P.	 Impact 
ecordPcv 
j-i,flmactof 
•	 ______ 
TT 
Figure 2.	 Mishap Site
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Figure 3.	 Close-up View of Leading Edge of Roof at Point Where the Deceased Fell 
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Figure 4.	 View of Mishap Location From Roof 
Subsequent to the mishap, the Board noticed damage to the rain gutter, near the location of the 
fall, with outward bending of the upper rim of the gutter in particular. The Board concluded that 
the deceased most likely contacted the gutter as he fell from the roof. This gutter damage cart be 
seen in Figure 3. 
The mishap was witnessed by an SGS logistics coordinator standing on a first-floor exterior 
landing (approximately 4 ft high), on the south side of Building M6-744, approximately 200 ft 
northwest of the scene of the mishap (see Figure 5). At the time of the mishap, the sun was 
directly overhead and did not appear to interfere with the line of sight of the witness. The witness 
called 911 within seconds of observing the mishap.
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Figure 5.	 Location of Mishap Witness Relative to Mishap Site 
2.4	 Emergency Response 
The 911 call was received at 1325, and Fire/Rescue (FIR) and Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) were dispatched at 1327. FIR and EMS arrived on the scene at 1328. First contact with 
and initial assessment of the patient occurred at 1329. 
FIR immediately requested helicopter transport, a second F/R ladder truck, and a second 
ambulance, while the EMS paramedics continued to assess and began to treat the patient. 
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At 1331, Dispatch learned that First Flight (the Holmes Regional Medical Center helicopter 
medevac) was not available, and in accordance with protocol, called in Air Care (the ORMC 
helicopter medevac). 
The EMS paramedics continued to assess, treat, and try to stabilize the patient. They were joined 
by the second ambulance crew at about 1335. Initially, the patient was breathing spontaneously, 
but after receiving preparation for intubation, he required artificial ventilation. His heart was 
monitored, he was given intravenous fluids, and his spine was stabilized with a cervical collar 
and a backboard. 
The medical director of the KSC Occupational Health Facility arrived on the scene about 1340 
and helped the paramedics assess and treat the patient. 
A NASA safety specialist arrived on the scene at about 1350 and took control of the scene as the 
lead for the Incident Response Team (IRT). 
The Air Care medevac helicopter arrived on the scene at 1356. The patient was carried to the 
medevac helicopter at 1405. The helicopter departed for ORMC at 1410 and arrived at ORMC at 
about 1428. 
Evaluation and treatment of the patient continued at ORMC. However, the medical staff could 
not save his life, and the patient was pronounced dead at 1606. 
2.5	 Events After the Mishap 
An OSHA representative performed a site investigation on March 21, 2006. 
SGS formed a mishap investigation board on March 17, 2006. Written direction appointing a 
mishap investigation board president was signed by the president of SOS on March 20, 2006. 
The NASA Type A Building M6794 Roofing Fatality Mishap Investigation Board, hereafter 
referred to as the Board, convened on March 22, 2006 and began executing its responsibilities in 
accordance with NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8621,1A, NASA Procedural 
Requirements for Mishap Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping. The formal appointment 
letter was issued on March 24, 2006, and was signed by the KSC Director on March 24, 2006. 
The Board conducted its investigation independently of the actions taken by OSHA and SOS. 
On March 24, 2006, the Board released the mishap site, and SOS directed another construction 
contractor (Sauer, Inc.) to cover the opening left on the northeast corner of the M6-794 roof 
because rain was expected and flight hardware was in the building. This opening was left on the 
roof by Oneida because all work had stopped subsequent to the mishap on March 17. On 
March 27, 2006, Oneida returned to the job site to complete all remaining work on the M6-794 
roof, using adequate fall protection.
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3.	 INVESTIGATION 
	
3.1	 Approach 
The purpose of the Board was to gather information; analyze the facts; identify the proximate 
causes, root causes, and contributing factors relating to the mishap; and recommend appropriate 
actions to prevent a similar mishap from occurring in the future. 
The Board met with the leader of the Incident Response Team (IRT), visited the mishap site, 
identified and interviewed witnesses, and analyzed events and conditions to identify proximate 
and root causes of the mishap. Each element of the investigation is further described in the 
following subsections. 
	
3.2	 Chronology of Mishap Investigation 
On March 22, 2006, the 1RT lead briefed the Board on the activities that occurred at the mishap 
site from the time the mishap occurred to appointment of the Board. Witness statements taken at 
the site were turned over and entered into the Board files. 
The Board's first data collection effort was to visit the mishap site on March 22, 2006 (see 
Figures 1 through 5). SOS erected scaffolding to allow the Board access to view the roof. 
Photographs were taken of the roof, impact area, and general conditions of the building and 
surrounding area. In addition, the Board was aware of a witness who saw the mishap from an 
adjacent building. Photographs were taken from that witness's line of sight. Measurements were 
taken of the roof area, impact area, and the witness's distance from the roof. Physical evidence 
belonging to the deceased was secured. 
The Board then identified an initial interview list. Interviews of workers involved, management, 
safety specialists, fall protection specialists, and trainers were scheduled and conducted. The list 
was continually updated based on data received from witness statements, documents collected, 
discussions with managers on suggested issues/areas of emphasis development of a timeline, 
and development of the event and causal-factor tree. During the course of the investigation. 
institutional cultural safety issues, both within NASA and at the contractor level, were explored, 
expanding the interview list. The interview list remained open and was continually expanded 
throughout the investigation. 
A timeline of the key events leading up to the mishap was initially constructed, identifying all of 
the events related to the mishap, along with dates and times that were known. The timeline of the 
mishap was thither developed using data gathered in interviews and records of the emergency 
response personnel. The timeline remained a working document, continually updated as witness 
statements and documents were received. 
Using an expanded event and causal4actor tree (developed with Relex Fault Tree Analysis 
software) to assess all possible events and causes, the Board began to identify proximate causes. 
A proximate cause is an event that occurred or condition that existed immediately before the 
mishap that directly resulted in the mishap occurrence, and if eliminated or modified, would have 
prevented the undesired outcome. The Board also consulted Modified Incident Analysis 
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Technique (IAT), Management Oversight Risk Tree WORT), and Taproot logic to trigger 
questions that help link what happened with why it happened. The tree was pared down to the 
plausible events and causes that eventually led to the identification of the root causes, which are 
those events, conditions, or organizational factors that contributed to or created a proximate 
cause, and if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap. Contributing factors, 
observations, and failed harriers were also noted. Recommendations were developed to 
specifically address each root cause, the implementation of which should help prevent this type 
of mishap from recurring. 
3.3	 Data Collection and Development 
3.3.1	 Evidence, Interviews, and Documentation 
Physical evidence included medical results (e.g., KSC/Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
ICCAFS] EMS report and medical examiner's report), Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
Incident Sheet, and items collected from the deceased and the mishap site. Physical evidence 
belonging to the deceased (i.e., harness, lanyard, hammer, shoes, leather clip, hammer, bag with 
screws) was secured from the KSC institutional Safety and Quality Branch. An evidence log was 
developed. All individuals, excluding those working on the Board, were required to sign the log 
prior to viewing the evidence. 
The Board conducted formal (privileged) and informal interviews. For the formal interviews, the 
Board instituted a policy of having two or three Board members present during each interview 
and executed it throughout the investigation. With permission from each witness, the Board used 
a court reporter during the formal interviews. This process proved highly effective in that real-
time transcripts were provided to the Board. Interviewers recognized the value of being able to 
listen to witness discussion for follow-up questioning without the distraction of having to take 
detailed notes. The informal interviews were conducted in the presence of either the entire Board 
or a partial Board, but without a court reporter. These included interviews with fall protection 
specialists, both civil service and contractor, to assist the Board on technical questions. 
Records and documentation were gathered as part of the interview process. Some witnesses were 
asked to bring documents as part of the interview. Document requests were made of NASA 
officials, the prime contractor, and the subcontractor. All parties were responsive to requests. 
Other documents were gathered by Board members. The major area of emphasis on document 
gathering was safety requirements, procedures and practices of the prime contractor and 
subcontractor, Federal regulatory requirements, NASA requirements, and KSC requirements. 
Documentation was requested and received from all parties related to actual implementation of 
these safety requirements as they applied to the specific job. Included in the data gathering were 
procurement regulations and contractual documents to analyze safety flowdown requirements. 
See Appendix A for a list of all reference documents Appendix B for terms and definitions; 
Appendix C for abbreviations, acronyms, and symbols used in this report; Appendix 1) for 
OSHA's Form 301 completed for the Building M6-794 roofing fatality; Appendix E for the 
Interim Safety Alert; and Appendix F for the Event and Causal-Factor Tree (Relex).
19
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type AMishap 
3.3.2	 Timeline 
The Board organized the events into a timeline, which is portrayed in Table 1. 
Table i.	 Mishap Timeline 
I Time Date 
09/15/05
EST)
SOS awarded roofing contract to Oneida Construction, Inc. 
Limited Notice to Proceed issued by SOS. 09/15/05 
09/15105 Prework conference held. 
Oneida safety plan completed (tall protection included). Oneida superintendent training 
09/19/05
certifications included. 
09/23105 SOS Safety approved Oneida safety plan. 
Full Noticeto Proceed issued by SOS. 
11/11105
site. 
11/14/05 Site work began (screw replacement). Oneida Workers 1 and 2 (fall protection included). 
12105/05 Training certifications completed for 
Stop Work Letter issued by SOS because of root leaks. 	
- - 12/12/05
sos subcontract administrator and Oneida agree at weekly status meeting that site work 03/15/06
would resume on 03117106.
with SOS safety monitor staling that site work 
03/15106 SOS construction monitor left voice message 
would resume on 03/17106. 
materials from KSC Safety Slanddown to its employees at regular weekly 
03/16/06 AM Oneida presented 
safety meeling. 
sos construction monitor (net safety monitor) visited worksite—no workers onSite. 
03/17/06 0650 
03/17/06 0700 sos construction monitor departed job site. 2 arrived onsite but could not begin work 
03117/06 0747 Oneida superintendent and Oneida Workers 1 and because the aerial lift had not arrived.
superintendent and Workers 1 and 2 
03/17/06 0747 sos construction monitor visited work site—Oneida 
onsite waitin	 for aerial lift to begin work. 
03/17/06 - 0750 Oneida superintendent briefed 
SGS construction monitor on work to be d one. 
03/17/06 0800 SGS constWctioitortlot0 
03/17/06
Oneida crew informally discussed work to be done. 
03/17/06 - 1015 Aerial lift arrived.
on northwest corner of root, with Workers l and 2 working from the 
03/17/06 Crew replaced panels 
aerial lilt while the su erintendent worked from the roof. 
03/17/06
Crow replaced panel on southeast corner, working from the root. 
Break for lunch (Oneida superintendent ate lunch separately; Oneida Workers 1 and 2 drove 
03/17/06 
03/17/06 1310
to lunch 
sos construction monitor stopped at job site to check progress. 
03/17/06 1310 Crew returned to job site. 
03/17/06 -1320 sos construction monitor loft job site. 
03/17/06 - 1320
Crew finished installing fasteners on the southeast corner of root. 
03/17/06 Crew walked to northeast corner of roof. 
Superintendent loosened tongs onhghtfl 	 protection wire clamps. 03/17/06
Crew predrilled holes in third (final) motel roofing panel. 03/17/06 
03/17106
Crew began installing the final metal roofing panel in the northeast corner 01 roof. 
.........................	 I,,, hr,ilinfl ten end of roofin g panel.
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Date
Time 
(EST) Event 
03/17/06 Worker 1 lifted lower end of roofing panel and began moving toward leading edge of roof while 
rotating panel into position, with superintendent/safety monitor holding other end. 
03/17/06 - 1324 Logistics coordinator from Building M6-744 heard outside noise, went to investigate, and 
noticed roofers working on the M6-704 roof. 
03/17106 1325 Worker 1 fell from roof while working on the northeast corner panel. 
03/17106 1325 SGS logistics Coordinator called 911 from Building M6-744. 
03/17/06 1325 Oneida superintendent and Worker 2 left roof via aerial lilt and ran to scene. 
03/17/06 Oneida employee asked SGS logistics coordinator (witness) if he called 911, and witness 
confirmed 911 call was made. 
03/17/06 1327 Fire/Rescue (FIR) and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) dispatched. 
03/17/06 1328 Firo/Rescue first responder and EMS (seconds later) arnved on scene. 
03117/06 1329 Initial patient contact. 
03/17/06 1329 FIR and EMS requested helicopter transport. 
03/17/06 1329
- 
FIR and EMS requested second FIR ladder truck and second ambulance. 
03/17/06 1331 First Flight (Holmes Regional Medical Center helicopter medevac) not available; Air Caro 
(ORMC medevac helicopter) called in. 
03/17/06 - 1335 Second ambulance arrived on scene. 
03/17/06 1340 Medical director from KSC Occupational Health Facility (OHF) arrived on scene. 
03/17/06 1341 NASA Safety Office notified. 
03/17/06 - 1350 NASA safety specialist arrived on scene, took witness statements, and assumed responsibility 
as Incident Response Team (IRT) lead. 
03/17/06 1358 Air Care medevac helicopter arrived on scene. 
03/17/06 1403 Air Care patient contact. 
03/17/06 1405 Patient transported to Air Care medevac helicopter. 
03/17/06 1410
- 
Air Care medevac helicopter departed to ORMC with patient. 
03/17/06 - 1428 Patient arrived at ORMC. 
03/17/06 1606 Patient pronounced dead. 
- indicates approximate time.
3.3.3	 OSHA Regulations 
OSI-IA 29 CFR 1926, Subpart M, was referenced for this investigation since the original contract 
and safety plan identified the job task as low-sloped roofing work. An OSHA investigation after 
the mishap identified this portion of the roofing work as steel erection, which is covered by 
29 CFR 1926, Subpart R. Specific OSHA references and/or reuirements text are used as they 
apply within the following analysis and findings. 
3.4	 Analysis 
3.4.1	 Proximate Causes 
After reviewing the chain of events in the timeline, the Board developed a preliminary set of 
proximate causes, which included working close to the edge, loss of balance, and improper fall 
protection. This preliminary set evolved into the final proximate causes.
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3.4.2	 Events and Causal-Factors Analysis 
An events and causal-factors (E&CF) tree was generated, with the preliminary proximate causes 
as the first line of development. Each branch of the tree was further developed to examine all 
reasonable or possible hypotheses for how the mishap could have occurred, and to systematically 
rule out as many alternatives as the evidence allowed. As the investigation progressed, items 
were addedand discussed. This tree was called the expanded E&CF tree. (See subsection 3.4.4. 
for items- not further developed.) 
The factors that were determined to be likely contributors to the mishap and the supporting 
evidence were developed further in a second, condensed tree. The remaining blocks were 
cleaned up, reworded, and combined to show the actual events resulting in the mishap. 
Contributing factors, failed barriers, root causes, and observations were identified. The following 
subsections provide narrative relating to these events and causes and the Board's analysis of the 
chain of conditions and events that caused the mishap. This analysis is consistent with the 
branches of the condensed E&CF tree. Section 4 presents a summary of the findings with 
accompanying recommendations. 
Starting with the mishap event "Fatality," the Board evaluated the final proximate causes and 
those events and conditions that led up to them. See Figure 6.
Undesired Outcome 
Proximate Cause 
And 
Deceased was working	 ceaied.fell: 
close to the edge of the roof
	 from theroof
(17. ft above the ground) 
Figure 6.	 Proximate Causes of Fatality 
3.4.2.1	 Proximate Cause 1: Deceased was working close to the edge of the roof (17 ft 
above the ground) without proper fall protection 
SGS awarded Subcontract X04524-6 to Oneida Construction, Inc., on September 15, 2005. The 
scope of work defined in the Oneida contract consisted of removal and replacement of existing 
aluminum rooting panels at the four corners of Building M6-794. Each metal roofing panel was 
3 ft wide by 16 ft long and weighed approximately 46 pounds. Removal and replacement also 
included installing new flashing as required and replacing or reinstalling the existing gutter 
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systems and lightning protection terminals as necessary. Additional scope included removal and 
replacement of all existing roof panel fasteners (screws). 
The northeast corner (mishap location) could not he reached by the aerial lift because a ground 
air-conditioning unit interfered with placement of the lift to access the work area. Therefore, the 
planned work method was for two workers to carry the panel to the roof work location, with one 
worker (the deceased) at the downslope cod of the panel and the other worker at the upsiope end. 
Fall protection for the two workers handling the panel was to be provided by a third crew 
member acting as the superintendent/safety monitor. This method of fall protection was in the 
Oneida Safety and Health Plan and was approved by SGS Safety, Health, and Training. 
During the actual work, the superintendent/safety monitor and the deceased worker maneuvered 
the panel into the required position, which placed the deceased close to the edge of the roof, with 
his back to the edge. The superintendent, who should have provided the safety monitoring, did 
not Warn the deceased that he was close to the edge (approximately 6 to 12 inches). No other 
additional fall protection (physical tie-offs, guardrails, safety nets, etc.) was provided, therefore, 
the Board determined a proximate cause of the mishap to be that the deceased was working 
close to the edge of the roof (17 ft above the ground) without proper fall protection. 
The intermediate causes of the deceased's working close to the edge of the roof without proper 
fall protection were identified and analyzed and are presented in Figure 7 and the following 
subsections.
Deceased was wQrkirrg 
dose to the edge of The roof 
(t7 ft above the ground) 
Intermediate Event/Condition 
Proximate Cause 
Failed Barrier 
And 
Oneida misclassified the Deceased did 
work as ow sloped roofing I use the Waçping Line and I physical restraints [instead of steel erection SMety Monitoring System 
Figure 7.	 Events Leading to the Deceased's Working Close to the Edge of the Roof 
Without Proper Fall Protection
3.4.2.1.1	 Oneida misclassified the work as low-sloped roofing instead of steel erection 
From inception, both SGS and Oneida considered this project to be and managed it as if it were a 
low-sloped roofing project. Accordingly, SGS permitted and Oneida used a Warning Line and 
Safety Monitoring System as the means of fall protection, when the use of a body harness and 
lanyard was not possible because of anchorage points not being available. This is in compliance
	
-	 fl with the OSHA oW 'lope Roofing [rcQuiremt.nts of 29 C_FR 1926 50I()(1O) which states
	
-	 F1t1on is the way it is used a J 
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"Roofing work on Low-slope roofs. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) 
of this section, each employee engaged in roofing activities on low-slope roofs, 
with unprotected sides and edges 6feet (1.8 m) or more above lower levels shall 
be protected from falling by guardrail systems, safety net systems, personal fall 
arrest systems, or a combination of warning line system and guardrail system, 
warning line system and safely net system, or warning line system and personal 
fall arrest system, or warning line system and safety monitoring system. Or on 
roofs 50-feet (15.25 m) or less in width (see Appendix A to subpart M of this part), 
the use of a safely monitoring system alone [Le. without the warning line system] 
is permitted." 
After the mishap, an OSHA investigation determined this particular work to he steel erection 
according to 29 CFR 1926, Subpart R. Steel erection is defined as the construction, alteration, or 
repair of steel buildings, bridges, and other structures, including the installation of metal decking 
and all planking used during the process of erection. Specifically, a letter of Standard 
Interpretation dated November 8, 2002, stated that replacement of metal roof panels is steel 
erection, covered by 29 CFR 1926.150(b)(1). The same letter also specifies that control decking 
zones (CDZs), which do not require fall protection if under 30 ft in height, may only be used for 
the initial installation of metal decking. Because this work was (1) a metal decking repair, (2) 
not an initial installation, (3) not being performed in a CDZ, and (4) over 15 ft in height, 
OSHA's interpretation was that the workers were required to be "protected by guardrail systems, 
safety net systems, personal fall arrest systems, positioning device systems or fall restraint 
systems" (29 CFR 1926.760(a)(1)). 
Based upon the OSHA letter of Standard interpretation and the OSHA postmishap investigation, 
the Board determined that Oneida misclassified the work as low-sloped roofing instead of steel 
erection. Oneida was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work as steel 
erection (Root Cause 1). SGS did not inform Oneida that the work was steel erection because 
SGS also misclassified the work as low-sloped roofing instead of steel erection. 
SGS was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work as steel erection (Root 
Cause 2) until OSHA conducted its postmishap investigation. Adherence to and implementation 
of the more stringent fall protection requirements for steel erection described in 29 CFR 1926, 
Subpart R, may have prevented the mishap. See Figure 8. 
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Intermediate Event/Condition 
Oneida misclassified the
	 RootCause 
work as low-sloped roofing 
instead of steel erection
	
And 
SGS did not Inform 
Oneida that the work 
was steel erection 
SOS mledassffied the work as 
low-sloped roofing instead of 
steel erection 
SOS wasunaware of the OSHA 
interpretation to classify the 
work at steel erection 
Figure 8.	 Root Causes of Oneida Misclassifying the Work as

Low-Sloped Roofing Instead of Steel Erection 
3.4.2.1.2	 Superintendent did not use the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System 
correctly (Failed Barrier) 
The Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System, which is permitted by OSHA 29 CFR 
1.926.501(b)(10) for work on low-sloped roofs, was not used properly by the Oneida 
superintendent. Two OSHA violations were that the superintendent (1) did not use a warnin g
 line 
and (2) helped the Oneida workers carry the roofing panel while acting as the safety monitor (Figure 9).
25
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type A Mishap
Intermediate Event/Condition 
Failed Barrier 
Contributing Factor L	 And  
Superintendent did not use	
ISuperintendent helped 
move the roofing panel 
	
a warning line 	(Violation) 	
I 
I while acting as the safety 
-
monitor (Violation) 
	
Figure 9.	 Violations contributing to Superintendent's Failure To Use the Warning

Line and Safety Monitoring System Correctly 
	
3.4.2.1.2.1	 Superintendent did not use a warning line (Violation) 
Omission of a warning line was a violation of the OSHA requirement because in lieu of other fall 
protection systems a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System is allowed for work on low- 
sloped roofs (slopes less than 4:12 vertical:horizofltal, rise to run). The roof of Building M6-794 
has a slope of 2:12, which permitted the use of a safety monitor with a warning line system. On 
roofs that are less than 50 ft wide, a warning line is not required. However, the roof of Building 
M6-794 is approximately 120 ft wide, therefore requiring that a warning line be used in 
conjunction with the safety monitor. 
The root causes of and observations regarding the warning line violation are illustrated in Figure 
10 and discussed below. 
a.
Superintendent experienced no consequences from previous violations identified 
by SOS Safety (SGS subcontract number X05539). 
b. Oneida did not ensure its superintendent's compliance with the OSHA 
requirement for fall protection (Root Cause 3). 
Oneida considered this work to be low-slope roofing and was using a Warning 
Line and Safety Monitoring System as fall protection. The Board noted that the 
superintendent had been written up by SOS Safety for warning line and safety 
monitor violations on three separate occasions prior to this mishap. However, the 
noncomplianCeS were corrected on the spot and no further retraining, corrective 
action, or disciplinary action was taken by Oneida toward the superintendent or 
by SGS toward Oneida. The Board determined that because the npncomplianceS 
could have had fatal consequences and were committed by the same individual 
over a 6-day period, the noncornpliaflCCS should have been an indicator to SGS 
and Oneida management of the superintendent's lack of implementation of this 
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OSHA requirement. These noncompliances did not indicate a lack of knowledge 
of the warning line because the superintendent took corrective action after each 
notice of noncompliance by SGS Safety. 
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Figure 10.
	 Root Causes of and Observations Regarding Warning Line Violation 
C.	 Oneida experienced no consequences from previous violations identified by SOS 
Safety. 
SGS submitted seven Oneida subcontract records to the Board, comprising 59 
inspection records (33 were active sites and 26 showed no activity). Of the 33 
records for active sites, 7 identified safety violations, 3 of which related to fall 
protection. Despite these nonconformances SOS took no contractual actions 
toward Oneida.
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NASAIKSC did not ensure compliance with the OSHA requirement. 
(1) Neither SOS nor Oneida informed NASA of the superintendent's 
noncompliances. 
(2) Contractors and subcontractors were not required to inform NASA of 
all on-Center worksite OSHA non-compliances (Observation 6), and 
does not have a policy requiring contractors and subcontractors to report 
such noncompliances. 
	
e.	 SGS did not ensure Oneida's compliance with the OSHA requirement for fall 
protection (Root Cause 4). 
SOS allowed Oneida workers to perform roofing work without proper fall 
protection. The Oneida superintendent failed to use a warning line, in violation of 
OSHA regulations for low-sloped roofing work. He also helped move a roofing 
panel while acting as safety monitor, also an OSHA violation. Although SGS had 
previously written up the superintendent for warning line and safety monitor 
noncomplianccs, no contractual action was taken by SGS toward Oneida. Also, 
the Board had no evidence to suggest these noncompliances were ever presented 
to the Oneida owner/president. 
	
3.4.2.1.2.2	 Superintendent helped move the roofing panel while acting as the safety 
monitor (Violation) (Contributing Factor 1) 
Factors contributing to and observations regarding the safety monitor violation are illustrated in 
Figure 11 and discussed below. 
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	 Factors Contributing to and Observation Regarding the

Safety Monitor Violation 
a.	 OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502(h) states that the employer shall designate a competent 
person to monitor the safety of other employees, and that the employer shall 
ensure that the safety monitor complies with the following requirements: (1) be 
competent to recognize fall hazards; (2) warn the employee when it appears that 
the employee is unaware of a fall hazard or is acting in an unsafe manner; (3) be 
on the same walking/working surface and within visual sighting distance of the 
employee being monitored; (4) be close enough to communicate orally with the 
employee; and (5) not have other responsibilities which could take the monitor's 
atteniwn from the monitoring function (emphasis added). 
OSHA 29 CFR 1926.32(1) defines "competent person" as one who is capable of 
identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working 
conditions that are unsanitary or dangerous to employees, and who has 
authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them. 
The Board concluded that the superin tend entlsafety monitor pet-formed his duties 
improperly based on his location on the roof during
 his monitoring 
responsibilities, his failure to identify tripping hazards, and his act of physically 
assisting the workers with the roofing panel.
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b.	 Superintendent did not have enough people to perform the job. 
The job was more difficult than originally expected, using two workers. While 
replacing two other panels earlier in the morning on the same roof, the 
superintendent recognized a hazard to the fingers of the person lifting the leading 
edge of the adjacent sheet metal. As the workers slid the new sheet underneath the 
adjacent sheet while holding the edge up, their fingers were being pinched. By 
having a third person hold up the edge of the adjacent sheet, the pinch point 
hazard was eliminated. Instead of keeping himself free of other functions to act as 
safety monitor, the superintendent assisted the other workers with their task rather 
than seeking additional personnel. Superintendent did not stop the job and 
seek additional personnel when two workers were not sufficient 
(Contributing Factor 2). 
	
C.	 Superintendent experienced no consequences from previous violations identified 
by SGS Safety (SGS subcontract number X05539). 
The Board noted that the superintendent had been written up by SOS Safety for 
failure to use a warning line on three separate occasions prior to this mishap. 
However, the noncompliances were corrected on the spot and no further 
retraining, corrective action, or disciplinary action was taken by Oneida toward 
the superintendent or by SGS toward Oneida. The Board determined that because 
the noncompliances could have had fatal consequences and were committed by 
the same individual over a 6-day period, the noncompliances should have been an 
indicator to SGS and Oneida management of the superintendent's lack of 
implementation of this OSHA requirement. These noncompliances did not 
indicate a lack of knowledge of the warning line because the superintendent took 
corrective action after each notice of noncompliance by SOS Safety. 
	
3.4.2.1.3	 Deceased did not use physical restraints 
Events leading to the failure of the deceased to use physical restraints arc illustrated in Figure 12 
and discussed below. 
30
Mishap Report 
May 2006 
Deceased did not use
	
Intermediate Event/Condition
 
physical restraints
And 
	
Anchorage point s;ere
	 Deceased Was using 
Aerial (bucket) lift could
	 Superint 
not be used because of
	 erect scaff in not readily avallab Warning Line and Safety physical obstructions
Monitoring System 
Figure 12.
	 Events Leading to the Failure of the Deceased To Use Physical Restraints 
a.	 Aerial (bucket) lift could not be used because of physical obstructions. 
The superintendent determined that an aerial lift could not be used to access the 
area of the roof where the mishap occurred. This was due to the presence of an 
air-conditioning unit on the loading dock below, and steam lines (heat pipes) and 
railroad tracks below that level. This prompted the crew to work from the roof. 
h.	 Superintendent did not erect scaffolding (Figure 13). 
Scaffolding was not used to access the area of the roof where the mishap occurred 
because of the limited space available on the loading dock directly below. The 
available space was 7 ft 8 in wide by 12 ft deep, with width being the limiting 
dimension. This limited width was the result of a large air-conditioning unit being 
located 7 ft 8 in away from the cast end of the loading dock. 
After the mishap, scaffolding was installed in the available 7-ft 8-in-wide area to 
provide the Board a view of the roof. This scaffolding would not have allowed the 
workers full access to all areas of the leading edge where the work was being 
performed. Therefore, additional fall protection would still have been needed, 
besides scaffolding, to meet the fall protection requirements.
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Figure 13.	 Events Leading to the Superintendent's Decision Not To Erect Scaffolding 
For work on low-sloped roofs (slopes less than 4:12 vertical: horizontal, rise to 
run), an employer is permitted by OSHA 29 CFR 1926.501(b)(10) to use a 
Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System in lieu of other fall protection 
systems. The roof of Building M6-794 has a slope of 2:12, which permitted the 
use of a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System. On roofs that are less than 
50 ft wide, a warning line is not required. However, the roof of Building M6-794 
is approximately 120 ft wide, therefore requiring that a warning line be used in 
conjunction with the safety monitor. 
The OSHA standard allowing for a safety monitor with a warning line system for 
the type of roof involved in the mishap is a minimum standard. NASA/KSC fall 
protection practices follow the OSHA-defined standards for low-sloped roofs, 
which allow the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System rather than 
requiring a physical-restraint system (Root Cause 5). NASAIKSC 
management has the right to implement a more conservative fall protection 
policy, requiring a physical-restraint system. Had a physical restraint been used, 
there would not have been a fatality. 
	
C.	 Anchorage points were not readily available (Figure 14). 
Neither permanent nor temporary anchorage points were available or made 
available on Building M6-794 at the time of the mishap. The Board determined 
that permanent anchorage points were not part of the original 1964 facility design. 
Permanent anchors were not added later, and KSC policy did not require 
their installation (Observation 8). 
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Figure 14.
	 Events Leading to the Unavailability of Anchorage Points 
Temporary anchorage points were not used by the Oneida roofing crew
.
 for 
several reasons. First, the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System (permitted 
by OSJIA for low-sloped roofing work) was the fastest and least costly method to 
perform this job. Temporary anchorage points were not required by OSHA, 
NASA, KSC, or contractors. There is no evidence that temporary anchorage 
points, which could have been provided by Oneida, were ever considered prior to 
the roofing job commencing. In fact, the Oneida safety plan, which permitted the 
use of the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System, was properly submitted 
and approved by SOS Safety, Health, and Training in accordance with SOS 
OSFI-P-0215, Construction and Service Subcontractor Safety Program. The plan 
also complied with OSF-IA, NASA, KSC, and contractor safety requirements for 
low-sloped roofing work. The use of alternative methods, such as temporary tie-
offs or scaffolding, would have required additional time and cost to plan and set 
up. It should be noted that after the mishap, a temporary fall protection system 
(life lines) was used to allow the roofing job to be completed.
33 
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type A Mishap
The OSHA standard allowing for a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System 
for the type of roof involved in the mishap is a minimum standard. NASAJKSC 
fall protection practices follow the OSHA-defined standards for low-sloped 
roofs, which allow the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System rather 
than requiring a physical-restraint system (]toot Cause 5). NASAJKSC 
management has the right to implement a more conservative fall protection 
policy, requiring a physical-restraint system. Had a physical restraint been used, 
there would not have been a fatality. 
d.	 Deceased was using a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System (Figure 15). 
The scope of work consisted, in part, of removal and replacement of existing 
aluminum roofing panels at the four corners of Building M6-794. From inception, 
Oneida considered this project to be and managed this project as if it were a low-
sloped roofing project. Oneida misclassified the work as low-sloped roofing 
instead of steel erection. Accordingly, Oneida used the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System as the primary means offall protection when the use of a body 
harness and lanyard was not possible because of anchorage points being 
unavailable. 
On the morning of March 17, 2006, the day of the mishap, the deceased was using 
the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System as a means of fall protection in 
performance of this work. This system complied with OSHA requirements for 
work being performed on a low-sloped roof. OSHA 29 CFR 1926, Construction 
Industry Regulations permits the use of a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring 
System. The specific reference is as follows: 
OSHA 29 CFR 1926.501(b)(10): 
"Roofing work on Low-slope roofs. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) 
of this section, each employee engaged in roofing activities on low-slope roofs, 
with unprotected sides and edges 6 feet (1.8 in) or more above lower levels shall 
heprotectedfrO/flfalling by guardrail systems, safety net systems, personal fall 
arrest systems, or a combination of warning line system and guardrail system, 
warning line system and safely net system, or warning line system and personal 
fall arrest system, or warning line system and safety monitoring system. Or, on 
roofs 50-Jet (15.25 in) or less in width (see Appendix A to subpart Al of this part), 
the use of a safety monitoring system alone [i.e. without the warning line system] 
is permitted." 
The Building M6-794 roof met the requirement for a low-sloped roof (2:12 
horizontal: vertical slope) but was wider than 50 ft (approximately 120 ft). This 
regulation permitted the use of a warning line system combined with a safety 
monitoring system for the Building M6-794 roof, but a safety monitor alone was 
not sufficient because of the width of the roof. 
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Figure 15.
	 Events Leading to Use of the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System 
SOS's Request for Proposal (REV) Number X04524, "High Wind Resistance 
Roof Repairs, Building M6794, Supply Warehouse #1, KSC," was issued on 
July 25, 2005, The RFP contained an attachment titled "Safety Information and 
Requirements," which summarizes safety information, requirements, and 
regulations that subcontractors must follow whenever conducting work for SOS. 
Included in this attachment is the following requirement: 
Paragraph 33.0, SAFETY PLANS 
33.1 A project specific safety and health plan shall be written to the safety and 
health aspects of the job. Corporate safety and health plans will not 
suffice. Applicable portions of this attachment shall be used to develop the 
required safety and health plan. Review and acceptance of the safely plan 
by SGS SH&T shall occur prior to coinmen cement of work. Any 
specialized safety requirements (Confined Space, Management of Traffic, 
Radiation Safety Control Zones, etc.) shall be included in the Safety  Plan 
either in the body of the plan or an attachment. 
33,2 The site safety plan shall apply to all employees working on the site, 
whether they are Subcontractor or sub-tier employees. The Subcontractor 
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shall be responsible for ensuring all employees follow the prescribed 
safety plan. 
33.3 As a minimum, safety plans shall address all the items checked on the 
Safety Plan Requirements Checklist (Table 2). Additional items shall be 
addressed as necessary based on the specifics of the project. The Safety 
Specialists shall complete the Safety Plan Requirements Checklist and 
provide it to Subcontractors at the Pre-Bid meeting. 
33.4 When work is accomplished on Cc/IFS or PA PB, the portion of the 
Subcontractors safety plan that deal with public safety shall be sent to the 
Air Force to satisfy their "Accident Prevention Plan" requirements. SGS 
Subcontractors may provide a sample. 
Oneida's project-specific safety plan permitting the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System as a means of fall protection was submitted to SOS on 
September 19, 2005, and approved on September 23, 2005. The applicable 
language from the safety plan reads as follows: 
"Fall protection is used as a means of preventing workers for experiencing 
accidental fails from elevations. Fall protection shall be used by all Contractor 
employees working in an area where afall hazard exists. Ailfali protection 
systems shall comply with OSHA 1926 Subpart M. 
Contractor employees shall use OSHA and ANSI approved body harnesses and 
lanyards. Lanyards shall be attached above waste level to approved attachment 
points capable of withstanding 5000 pounds. Lanyards shall not be attached 
together. Where body harness and lanyards are not feasible, guardrail systems or 
positioning device systems shall be used. 
Contractor employees engaged in low sloped roof activities may use a. 
combination of the warning line system and safety monitoring system when the 
use of body harness and lanyard is not possible." 
After the mishap, an OSHA investigation determined this particular work to be steel erection in 
accordance with 29 CPR 1926, Subpart IL Specifically, a letter of Standard Interpretation dated 
November 8, 2002, stated that replacement of metal roof panels is steel erection, covered by 29 
CFR 1926.750(h)(1). SGS was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work as 
steel erection (Root Cause 2). SGS's unawareness of the OSHA interpretation prevented them 
from correctly classifying the job as one that required more stringent fall protection which in 
turn might have prevented the fall. 
In addition, NASAIKSC fall protection practices follow the OSHA-defifled standards for 
low-sloped roofs, which allow the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System rather than 
requiring a physical-restraint system (Root Cause 5). 
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3.4.2.2	 Proximate Cause 2: Deceased fell from the roof 
3.4.2.2.1	 Deceased lost his balance 
Events and conditions that may have contributed to the deceased's loss of balance are illustrated 
in Figure 16 and discussed below.
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Figure 16.
	 Events Leading to the Deceased's Loss of Balance 
The Board determined that the deceased either tripped or stumbled prior to falling off the roof 
rather than simply backing off the roof. The two most likely tripping hazards were the lightning 
protection wire that was located approximately 6 inches from the edge of the roof and the uneven 
working surface caused by the corrugated roof. The Board also determined that there was no oral 
warning provided by the superintendent/safety monitor to possibly allow the deceased to avoid 
the tripping hazard. 
a.	 Lightning protection wire was a tripping hazard. 
Many buildings on KSC have lightning protection wire along the edge of the roof. 
The wire is generally taut. The wire on Building M6-794 was located 
approximately 6 inches from the edge of the roof. This caused difficulties because 
the panels had to be slid under the wire. The wire had only a few inches of play, 
which restricted movement of the panel and required a repetitive process of 
moving the wire a few inches, moving the panel a few inches, and repeating the 
process until the panel was in place. To make the installation of the last panel 
easier, the Oneida workers removed one or two tongs (anchoring mechanism for 
the wire). This provided slack in the wire and allowed for easier placement or 
sliding of the panel into position. It is not known if loosening the wire made it
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more of a tripping hazard. Evidence collected suggests the deceased, while losing 
his balance, got his right heel caught in the wire. This may have prevented him 
from stepping back with his right foot to regain his balance. It remains unclear if 
the wire caused the deceased to trip or lose his balance, or if it prevented him 
from regaining his balance. However, one of these three events occurred. 
Therefore, the lightning protection wire may have caused the deceased to lose his 
balance. 
Corrugated roof was an uneven surface. 
The working surface of the roof consisted of corrugated metal panels with raised 
ribs (1.5 inches high by 2 inches wide), spaced 12 inches apart on center. The 
valley or low spot of the corrugated panel is approximately 8 inches wide. There 
is not sufficient evidence to determine if the deceased's foot hit the corrugated 
surface at an awkward angle causing him to roll his ankle. The possible rolling of 
his ankle may have resulted in him initially losing his balance prior to his right 
foot getting caught in the lightning protection wire. 
C.	 Safety monitor did not warn of tripping hazard(s). 
One function of the safety monitor is to alert workers when they are coming close 
to the roof's edge. The superintendent/safety monitor did not identify the hazards 
prior to beginning work or signal to the deceased when he was precariously close 
to the lightning protection wire and the roof ed ge. Also, the superintendent helped 
move the roofing panel while acting as the safety monitor. See subsection 
3.4.2.1.2.2. 
d.	 Deceased was impaired. 
Physical impairment of the deceased by drugs or alcohol could have increased the 
likelihood of his tipping, stumbling, or losing his balance; or upon tripping, 
stumbling, or losing his balance, being less able to regain his balance. The 
medical examiner's report concerning the deceased indicated that he was under 
the influence of alcohol and tested positive for the presence of 
tetrahydrocannabinol (TFIC), a marijuana metabolite. This was based on 
toxicological screening of antemortem blood (blood drawn before death) that was 
drawn at 1455 on March 17, 2006, about 90 minutes after the mishap and about 
70 minutes before the deceased's death. 
The blood alcohol content (BAC) of the deceased was .023 percent, as identified 
in the report of the Office of the Medical Examiner, District 9, State of Florida, 
using the antcmortem blood sample, was .023 percent. Since the time the blood 
was drawn was about 90 minutes after the mishap, the deceased's BAC at the 
time of the mishap would have been higher. Generally, BAC decreases by .012 to 
.020 percent per hour, based on the individual's alcohol metabolism rate. 
Assuming the minimum rate of alcohol metabolism, the deceased's BAC could 
have been about .041 percent (or higher) at the time of the mishap. This is 
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consistent with two to three drinks with lunch that day or heavy drinking the night 
before. Outward signs of the effects of alcohol begin at about .03 percent BAC 
and include euphoria; talkativeness; increased self-confidence; decreased 
inhibitions; diminution of attention, judgment, and control; beginning of sensory-
motor impairment; and toss of efficiency in finer performance tests. At 
approximately .04 percent BAC, the deceased could have had some performance 
decrement that affected his motor coordination and judgment, increasing the 
likelihood of his tripping, stumbling, or losing his balance, or decreasing his 
ability to right himself after a trip or stumble. As a point of comparison, the 
Florida Driving Standard for driving under the influence is 0.08 percent BAC. 
The marijuana metabolites reported by the Office of the Mdical Examiner, 
District 9, State of Florida, included delta-9 THC, which is the principal 
neuroactive ingredient (none detected), and delta-9 carboxy THC, an inactive 
ingredient (II nanograms per milliliter). Since the active metabolite, delta-9 THC, 
was negative, it had been at least 2 hours since the use of marijuana (sometime 
before 1255). The presence of the inactive metabolite, delta-9 carboxy THC, 
indicates the deceased (1) smoked a single marijuana cigarette less than 4 hours 
before the blood was drawn (sometime after 1055), (2) smoked heavily the night 
before, or (3) both. There is disagreement in the literature as to whether marijuana 
use affects coordination and locomotion. It is unlikely that the use of a single 
marijuana cigarette by itself would have had a significant effect on the motor 
coordination of the deceased. However, even a small decrement in coordination or 
locomotion, combined with the effects of alcohol use, could have resulted in 
performance decrement greater than either the alcohol or marijuana use alone. As 
a result of these two factors, the deceased could have had some performance 
decrement that affected his motor coordination, increasing the likelihood of his 
tripping, stumbling, or losing his balance, or decreasing his ability to right himself 
after a trip or stumble. 
This condition of impairment by drugs and alcohol may have contributed to the 
mishap, and therefore, the Board determined this to be a contributing factor in this 
mishap. While not legally intoxicated under Florida's Driving Standard, the 
deceased was under the influence of alcohol and tested positive for marijuana 
(Contributing Factor 4). 
3.4.3	 Additional Findings 
3.4.3.1	 Contractor findings 
3.4.3.1.1	 Inadequate coordination within SGS resulted in Oneida working without the 
knowledge of SGS Safety (Observation 7) 
At a weekly status meeting, held on March 15, 2006, the SGS subcontract administrator and 
Oneida agreed that site work would resume on March 17, 2006 (after several weeks of 
inactivity). The SGS construction monitor was also notified on March 16 that the subcontractor 
would resume work on March 17, and he subsequently called the SOS Safety representative
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(responsible for monitoring the subcontractor's performance) and left a voice message. However, 
the Safety representative did not listen to this voice message until after the mishap occurred. 
Therefore, Oneida resumed site work without the knowledge of SGS Safety. 
3.4.3.1.2	 Oneida did not maintain a current list of employees who were working on 
the job site (Observation 1) 
As required by Subcontract X04524-6, Oneida submitted a safety plan, which listed employees 
they planned to have working on the job site. This plan also listed training certifications for each 
employee and was approved by SGS on September 23, 2005. Oneida was required to maintain 
this list, making updates as new employees came onto the job site, and keep a current copy on 
the job site. However, Oneida did not have a current employee list onsite on the day of the 
mishap (March 17, 2006). 
3.4.3.1.3	 Oneida did not conduct, or did not document, all weekly safety meetings 
(Observation 2) 
Oneida was required to conduct and document weekly safety meetings. However, it is unclear 
whether they conducted all of these weekly meetings (during the time that there was site activity) 
because documentation was not available for all meetings. 
3.4.3.2	 Drug and alcohol testing was not performed on Oneida workers involved in 
the mishap (Observation 10) 
The requirement for postmishap testing for drugs and alcohol was ambiguous. 
There are five references to drug/alcohol testing in NPR 862 1. IA, NASA, Procedural 
Requirements for Mishap Reporting. Investigating, and RecordkeePing. Subsection 3.8, Initiate 
Drug Testing, states "If the mishap results in a fatality or personal injury requiring immediate 
hospitalization, or in damage estimated to be in excess of $10,000 to government or private 
property, the supervisor shall initiate post-accident/unsafe practice testing per NPR 3792.IA, 
NASA Plan for a Drug-Free Workplace." Then under responsibilities. "1.4.18 f. The IRT shall: 
Advise the supervisor if drug testing should be requested."; "1.4.20g. The Center Safety Office 
shall: Advise the supervisor that drug testing should be initiated."; and "1.4.22 c. Supervisors 
shall: Initiate dru g testing after a mishap if the mishap results in a fatality, or personal injury 
requiring immediate hospitalization, or in damage estimated to be in excess of $10,000 to 
government or private property." Finally in Figure 2, Mishap Organizational Responsibilities 
Matrix, it notes that the supervisor has the primary responsibility to initiate drug testing, while 
the IRT and the Center Safety Office have a support responsibility. Since this "mishap resultiedi 
in a ... personal injury requiring immediate hospitalization, the supervisor" should have 
"initiate[d] post-accident/unsafe practice testing per NPR 3792.1A, NASA Plan for a Drug-Free 
Workplace." Further, the IRT and the Center Safety Office should have advised the supervisor 
that drug testing should be initiated. 
NPR 3792.lA, NASA Plan for a Drug-Free Workplace, states in subsection 1.2.2.7 ' 'T'.0. 12564 
mandated that this Plan cover only Federal civil service employees," so this document was not 
applicable in this mishap. However, NPR 3792.1A further states "on March 28, 1996, NASA 
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implemented a requirement for NASA contractors to institute and maintain a program for 
achieving a drug-free workforce by providing for pre-employment reasonable suspicion, 
random, postaccident, and followup testing of contractor employees responsible for safety-
sensitive, security, or national security functions as required by the Civil Space Employee 
Testing Act of 1991. These requirements may be found at 
.48 CFR 1852.223." So this CFR is the 
applicable document for contractors (if the particular clause for development of a drug- and 
alcohol-free workplace is in their contract), not NPR 3792.1A. Therefore, there is no requirement 
in NPR 8621.IA for initiating drug testing in mishaps involving contractors, 
48 CFR 1852.223-74(h)(1) slates "The Contractor shall institute and maintain a program for 
achieving a drug- and alcohol-free workforce. As a minimum, the program shall provide for 
preemployment, reasonable suSpicion, random, post-accident, and periodic recurring (follow-up) 
testing of contractor employees in sensitive positions for use, in violation of applicable law or 
Federal regulation, of alcohol or a controlled substance" This CFR clause is in Oneida's 
contract, so there is a requirement for the contractor to have a drug- and alcohol-free workforce. 
However, there was no requirement for the contractor's plan to include anyone except those in 
"sensitive positions." It states in.48 CFR 1823.570-1, Definitions, "Employee in a sensitive 
position means a contractor or subcontractor employee who has been granted access to classified 
information; a contractor or subcontractor employee in other positions that the contractor or 
subcontractor determines could reasonably be expected to affect safety, security, National 
security, or functions other than the foregoing requiring a high degree of trust and confidence; 
and includes any employee performing in a position designated 'mission critical' pursuant to the 
clause at 1852.246-70. The term also includes any applicant who is interviewed for a position 
described in this paragraph." Sensitive employee, as defined, would not have included the 
deceased or either of the other two Oneida workers on the roof. Therefore, there was no 
requirement for these individuals to be included in the company's drug- and alcohol-free 
workforce program. 
The CFR requirement, however, is a minimum required program. Oneida's Drug-Free 
Workplace Policy applies to all employees. It notes that testing will be performed in accordance 
with Florida Statute §440.101 and §440.102 and will include job applicant, reasonable suspicion, 
routine fitness for duty, and follow-up drug testing; and it allows testing for amphetamines, 
cannabinoids, cocaine, phencyclidine, niethaqualonc, opiates, barbiturates, hcnzodiazepines, 
methadone, propoxyphene, codeine, heroin, hydrornorphone, LSD, morphine, and alcohol. These 
Florida Statutes note that the individual must have been given notice of the plan and what is 
included in the plan. All three of the Oneida employees involved in the mishap (including the 
deceased) signed Certificates of Acknowledgment that they had "received and read this 
Company's Drug-Free Workplace Program and Policy Regarding Substance Abuse" and that the 
program was explained to them. The Statutes further state that reasonable suspicion testing 
includes "information that an employee has caused, contributed to, or been involved in an 
accident while at work," which was the case in this mishap. 
Therefore, the only requirement to initiate postmishap drug testing was with the company 
(Oneida) itself in accordance with its own policy. But there is no procedure within Oneida's 
policy to determine who will initiate the testing or how it will be done. Further, while there is a 
requirement in 48 CFR 1852.223-74 that any individual who tested positive on the program be
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suspended from working in a sensitive position for NASA until rehabilitation has been 
successfully completed, there is no obligation for the company (in this case, Oneida) to report 
those results to either SOS (the prime contractor) or NASA. While there was a requirement on 
Oneida's part, according to its Drug-Free Workplace Program, to perform postmishap drug and 
alcohol testing on the employees involved in the mishap, this was not done. 
3.4.3.3	 Other than OSHA minimum standards, no single, standardized fall protection policy exists across all NASA Centers or operating locations (ObservatiOn 9) 
Two questions were asked of Safety and Mission Assurance directors at all NASA Centers, plus 
Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF): 
Question 1: Describe your Center's policy with respect so work that is being conducted on a 
"low-sloped roof" and the use of a. monitoring system versus fall protection systems. 
Responses: Centers' policies regarding use of the safety monitoring system versus 
positive fall protection fell into two categories: 
• Warming Line and Safety Monitoring System Allowed: Six Centers (GSFC, GRC, 
ARC, KSC, JSC, and MSFC) and WSTF permit use of the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring Systems which is the minimum OSHA requirement in 29 CFR 
1926.501(b)(10). 
• Warning Line. and Safety Monitoring System Not Allowed-, Four Centers (LaRC, 
.DFRC, SSC, and JPL) and MAF do not permit use of the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring Systems but go beyond the OSHA minimum and require a physical-
restraint fall protection capability, such as a guardrail system, safety net system, or 
personal fall arrest systems (tie-offs). 
Question 2: Explain how your Center's safety requirements for roofing work are flowed 
down to your prime contractors and their subcontractors. For example, do all your 
subcontractors use a Centerwide policyforfall protection or are they allowed to bring in 
their own equipment or plans? 
Responses: All ten Centers, plus MAF and WSTF, indicated they had it positive 
flowdown of safety requirements to their prime contractors and subcontractors. 
Generally, Center safety requirements (including those for roofing operations) flow down 
to prime contractors and subcontractors through contractual safety clauses and are 
implemented through communication in prework meetings, tailgate safety discussions, 
and periodic safety meetings. Compliance is verified through oversight (safety 
inspections and surveys) of operations by Federal and contractor safety personnel. Safety 
requirements are further detailed in the contractor/subcontractor work and safety plans 
for the specific task. Some Centers allow the subcontractors to bring in additional fall 
protection equipment as long as it is called out in the safety plan. However, almost all 
Centers stated that it was the prime contractor's responsibility, not NASA's, to ensure 
that its subcontractors performed the work in a safe manner and adhered to the Center's 
safety requirements. 
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Although all Centers and operating locations have policies that are compliant with OSHA 
minimum fall protection requirements, some Centers have chosen to go above and beyond the 
OSHA minimum and have implemented more conservative fall protection policies requiring 
physical restraints. 
	
3.4.3.4	 Training findings for Oneida Construction, Inc. 
The subcontractor (Oneida), according to its contract with SGS, was responsible for certifying 
that all employees had completed and were current in training that was required by OSHA 
standards. The OSHA standard identified in the contract, to which the workers were to be 
trained, was 29 CFR 1926.503, Training Requirements. The training requirements in 29 CFR 
1926.503(a)(2) state "The employer shall assure that each employee has been trained, as 
necessary, by a competent person qualified in 1926 Subpart M, Fall Protection." 
It further states in 29 CFR 1926.503(b)(1): 
"The employer shall verify compliance with paragraph (a) of this section by 
preparing a written ceritjicatwn record. The written certification record shall 
contain the name or other identity of the employee trained, the date (s) of the 
training, and the signature of the person who conducted the training or the 
signature oj'the employer. If the employer relies on training conducted by another 
employer or completed prior to the effective date of this section, the certification 
record shall indicate the date the employer determined the prior training was 
adequate rather than the date of the actual training." 
For the superintendent the records provided were certification cards from the local union, which 
demonstrated that he had received Steel Erection certification and the OSHA 10-hour course, 
which included Fall Protection subpart M. Oneida records identified the superintendent as having 
fall protection and fall protection competent-person training. For the deceased and the other 
Oneida worker, the training information provided by Oneida was a checklist with the workers' 
names and a certification by the Oneida training coordinator that they had been trained. The 
training for these workers had been provided by the Oneida training coordinator. 
Oneida provided no evidence that either the deceased or the other Oneida worker was 
trained by a competent person qualified in 29 CF'R 1926, Subpart M, Fall Protection. 
Therefore, the training of the deceased and the other Oneida worker was deficient 
(Observation 3). 
The training certification provided by Oneida was not signed by the trainer or the 
employer, so it was in technical violation of 29 CFR 1926.503(b)(1) (Observation 4). 
	
3,4.3.5	 Training findings for SGS, United Space Alliance (USA), and Boeing 
As part of its request to evaluate fall protection in general at KSC, the Board reviewed the fall 
protection training given at KSC by SOS, USA, and Boeing. 
According to the Gravitec Systems Inc. Fall Hazard Survey, Final Report, October 2005:
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"The current level of training at KSC is limited to four hours of information. None 
of the training programs through USA, InDyne, Boeing, and NASA are more than 
four hours. These four hours may be high quality, however it is not possible to 
cover basic requirements offall protection training in this amount of time." 
While KSC fall protection training was, for the most part, adequate for construction 
workers, it was insufficient for specialized training for competent or qualified persons and 
inspector training (Observation 5). 
3.4.3.6	 Flowdown of Safety Requirements 
The SOS Prime Contract NAS 10-99001 contains the following pertinent safety clauses: 
a. Part I, Section H, Special Contract Requirements: 
NASA Clauses: 1852.223-70, Safety and Health 
b. Part II, Contract Clauses, Section 1, Clauses Incorporated by Reference 
(1)	 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (48 FR Chapter 1) clauses: 
(a) 52.222-4, Contract Work Hours & Safety Standards Act 
(b) 52.223-6, Drug Free Workplace 
(2)	 NASA FAR Supplement (48 CFR Chapter 18) Clauses: 
1852.223-74, Drug and Alcohol - Free Workforce 
These clauses were flowed down appropriately to the Oneida Construction, Inc., subcontract. 
Contract clause flowdown to the subcontractor was not a contributing factor to the mishap 
(Observation ii). 
3.4.3.7	 Behaviors identified in mishaps call be used to study and improve the KSC 
safety culture 
The Board was requested by the appointing official to explore the institutional safety culture at 
KSC (KSC culture). This subsection discusses interviews with KSC managers, defines culture, 
and identifies how the events of mishaps may be related to the KSC culture by focusing on 
observable behaviors. 
As an indicator of the KSC culture, the Board discussed safety culture durin g the interviews of 
civil-servant and contractor managers. These managers indicated they understood that safety 
culture begins with and is enforced by the leadership of the organization. 
Culture is defined as the attitudes, values, and behaviors that are characteristic of a particular 
social group or organization, commonly described as "the way we do things here." Behavior can 
be seen or observed by others, whereas the attitudes, values, beliefs, and perceptions cannot be 
seen directly. 
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Although underlying attitudes and values may affect behavior, and therefore culture, they cannot 
be directly observed or measured. One strategy to understand KSC culture is to focus on the 
identification of observable behaviors of the people involved in a mishap. A single occurrence of 
a behavior may not he. an
 indicator of the current culture, but if it is seen consistently, it would he 
a more likely indicator of the KSC culture. if the behaviors associated with this mishap were 
compared with behaviors identified in other mishaps, then consistently observed behaviors could 
be identified and conclusions could be drawn relating to the KSC culture. Actions could then be 
taken to modify these repeated behaviors to improve the KSC culture. 
The following are examples of behaviors from this mishap that could be compared to behaviors 
observed in other mishaps: 
Employees violated known rules or requirements: 
Example of behavior: Superintendent helped move the roofing panel while 
acting as the safety monitor. 
-	 Example of behavior: Superintendent did not use the warning line. 
Teamwork: Workers did not take action In protect one another. 
-	 Example of behavior: Coworkers did not stop the superintendent from 
working while acting as the safety monitor. 
Example of behavior: Coworkers did not stop the superintendent when he 
failed to add the warning line. 
Management did not follow up adequately on noncompliances: 
SGS and Oneida did not apply consequences for previous repeated fall 
protection violations by the same individual. 
It is possible that there may not be one well-defined KSC safety culture, but instead a composite 
of cultures of different organizations, work&oups, contractors, civil servants, etc. The culture of 
these individual subgroups could be very different and may have a stronger effect on an 
individual than the overall KSC culture, so they need to he considered also. 
In conclusion, the safety culture of KSC and its subgroups may be affected by identifying the 
observed behaviors associated with the events and contributing factors for this or other mishaps 
and taking action to influence the behaviors. Because of limited scope and resources, the Board 
identified this methodology but did not conduct an analysis. 
3.4.4 Items not further developed in the event and causal factor tree 
As factors were developed in the E&CF tree, some were conclusively eliminated as having 
nothing to do with the mishap. In other cases, the evidence was insufficient to rule out a factor. 
However, in most of these cases, the evidence that was available indicated that the factor did not 
play a role in the mishap.
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Some elements could he dismissed at a high level in the tree, but most required delving into 
lower levels. Some elements were identified as speculation or extrapolations that evidence did 
not support. These were also eliminated. This subsection pertains to events, conditions and 
failed barriers that the Board ruled out as factors in the mishap based on evidence or that were 
not included because there was not enough evidence to conclude that they were factors. 
The Board evaluated various aspects of the working condition to determine if they may have had 
a role in the mishap. Factors considered included whether the deceased understood his proximity 
to the roof edge, whether the safety monitor's line of sight was blocked, and whether the safety 
monitor could have seen the deceased's foot as it got close to the tripping hazard if he (the safety 
monitor) had been in a better position. The Board determined that there was not enough 
evidence to determine if these were factors. 
The Board evaluated various aspects of potential impairment of the deceased, including fatigue, 
stress, and visual impairment, and determined that these were not factors in the mishap. 
The Board evaluated whether a push, intentional or inadvertent, occurred and led to the mishap 
and determined that this was not a factor. 
The Board evaluated whether environmental conditions, such as wind, temperature, glare, rain, 
moisture level of the corrugated roof, and noise levels, played a role in the mishap and 
determined that they were not factors. 
The Board evaluated various aspects of the decisionmaking by the workers on the roof: 
•	 Time pressure for the entire roofing job and on the day of the mishap was 
considered and was determined not a factor. 
•	
The workers and superintendent may not have perceived the danger of working on 
the roof because the job was thought to be very simple and quick—the roof was 
low-height and low-slope, and they had done this type of work often. There was 
not enough evidence to determine if these were factors. 
•	
The superintendent may have thought that he could perform the duties of safety 
monitor effectively while performing roofing work because he may not have 
considered that his attention would be diverted from his monitoring task while he 
helped to lift the panel. There was not enough evidence to determine if this was a 
factor. 
•	
The superintendent knew the rules for using the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System. but may have chosen to violate the rules because he 
considered it to be safe and did not expect negative consequences. There was not 
enough evidence to determine if these were factors. 
•	
The other workers did not correct the superintendent when he failed to use the 
warning line or when he chose to lift the panel while monitoring. It is not known 
why this occurred, but the Board's discussion included these possibilities: the 
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other workers may not have felt they had the authority to correct the 
superintendent; they may have trusted the superintendent's judgment; they had 
seen him do this in the past with no significant consequences; it may have become 
an accepted practice by the workers; or the other employees may have been 
preoccupied with their own tasks, and therefore may not have thought about 
challenging the decision. In all cases, there was not enough evidence to 
determine if these were factors. 
The Board evaluated the method the superintendent and workers selected to move the panel 
because it put the deceased very close to the leading edge of the roof at the time of the mishap. It 
appears that the method of moving the panel was coordinated on the spot, with informal verbal 
communication between the superintendent and the workers. There was not enough evidence to determine if this was a factor. 
4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1	 Proximate Causes 
The Board has determined that the Building M6-794 roofing fatality resulted from the proximate 
causes summarized in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. If either of these were eliminated or modified, this mishap 
would not have occurred. 
4.1.1	 Proximate Cause 1: Deceased was working close to the edge of the roof (17 ft 
above the ground) without proper fall protection 
Oneida personnel were removing and replacing a roofing panel on the northeast corner of 
Building M6-794. The deceased was working without proper fall protection because the work 
had been misclassified as low-sloped roofing instead of steel erection, which required physical 
restraints. For low-sloped roofing work, OSHA allowed use of a Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System in lieu of physical restraints. However, a warning line was not used and the 
safety monitor was helping the workers instead of acting solely as a safety monitor; both were 
violations of OSHA regulations for proper fall protection. 
4.1.2	 Proximate Cause 2: Deceased fell from the roof 
Evidence shows that the deceased either tripped or stumbled prior to falling off the roof, rather 
than stepped off the roof. The two most likely tripping hazards were the lightning protection wire 
(located approximately 6 inches from the edge of the roof) and the uneven working surface of the 
corrugated roof. 
4.2	 Root Causes and Recommendations 
The Board has determined the root causes for the Building M6-794 roofing fatality. These root 
causes, along with recommendations to prevent recurrence, are given in 4.2.1 through 4.2.5.
47
Building M6-794 Roofing Fatality 
Type A Mishap 
4.2.1	 Root Cause 1: Oneida was unaware of the OSBA interpretation to classify the 
work as steel erection (RCJ) 
Background: From inception, Oneida considered and managed this construction project as if it 
were a low-sloped roofing project. According to the low-sloped roofing regulations OSHA 
permits use of the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System for fall protection. However, 
OSHA's interpretation in a November 8, 2002, letter of Standard Interpretation classified this 
type of work as "steel erection," which prohibits use of the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring 
System and requires more stringent physical-restraint methods of fall protection. After the 
mishap, an OSHA investigation determined this particular work to be steel erection. 
Recommendation (RC1-1): When responding to an RFP and prior to preparing a safety plan, 
subcontractors should review OSHA regulations and letters of Standard Interpretation to 
properly classify the work. 
•	
When roofing jobs are performed subcontractors are responsible for determining 
the applicability of 29 CFR 1926.501 (low-sloped roof) and 29 CFR 1926.750 
(steel erection) in accordance with OSHA Standards and letters of Standard 
Interpretation. 
•	
Contract language should include information alerting subcontractors that the 
OSHA Area Office has a compliance assistance specialist available as a resource. 
462.2
	
	
Root Cause 2: SGS was unaware of the OSHA interpretation to classify the work
as steel erection (RC2) 
Background: Based upon the OSHA letter of Standard Interpretation and the OSHA postniishap 
investigation, the Board determined that Oneida misclassified the work as low-sloped roofing 
instead of steel erection. SGS did not inform Oneida that the work was steel erection because 
SGS also misclassified the work. Adherence to and implementation of the more stringent fall 
protection requirements for steel erection described in 29 CFR 1926, Subpart R, may have 
prevented the mishap. Both Oneida and SGS were unaware of the OSHA letter of Standard 
Interpretation to classify the work as steel erection until OSHA conducted its postmishap 
investigation. 
Recommendation (RC2-1): Prior to issuing an RPP, the prime contractor should review OSHA 
regulations and letters of Standard Interpretation to properly classify work. 
•	
When roofing jobs are performed, contractors are responsible for determining the 
application and applicability of 29 CFR 1926.501 (low-sloped root) and 29 CFR 
1926.750 (steel erection) in accordance with OSHA Standards and letters of 
Standard Interpretation. 
Contract language should include information alerting subcontractors that the 
OSHA Area Office has a compliance assistance specialist available as a resource. 
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Recommendation (RC2 . 2): NASAJKSC and prime contractors should review current ongoing 
work involving rooting to ensure proper work classification and compliance with OSHA 
Standards and letters of Standard Interpretation. 
	
4.2.3	 Root Cause 3: Oneida did not ensure its superintendent's compliance with the 
OSIIA requirement for full protection (RC3) 
Background: Oneida considered this work to be low-sloped roofing and was using a Warning 
Line and Safety Monitoring System as fall protection. The Oneida superintendent failed to use a 
warning line, in violation of OSHA regulations for low-sloped roofs. He also helped move a 
roofing panel while acting as safety monitor, also an OSHA violation. Althou gh SOS had 
previously written up the superintendent for warning line and safety monitor noncompliances, 
the Board had no evidence to suggest these noncompliances were ever presented to the Oneida 
owner/president. The Board determined that trend analysis of nonconformances could have 
identified this issue; however, the Board found no evidence that SGS had performed any trend 
analysis of nonconformances. 
Recommendation (RC3-1): Prime contractors should develop a mechanism to ensure that 
OSHA noncomplianccs immediately dangerous to life and health are reported to the 
subcontractor president/top management. 
	
4.2.4	 Root Cause 4: SGS did not ensure Oneida's compliance with the OSHA 
requirement for fall protection (RC4) 
Background: SOS allowed Oneida workers to perform roofing work without proper fall 
protection. The Oneida superintendent failed to use a warning line, in violation of OSHA 
regulations for low-sloped roofs. He also helped move a roofing panel while acting as safety 
monitor, also an OSHA violation. Although SOS had previously written up the superintendent 
for warning line and safety monitor noncompliances, no contractual action was taken by SGS 
toward Oneida. Also, the Board had no evidence to suggest these noncompliances were ever 
presented to the Oneida owner/president. The Board determined that trend analysis of 
nonconformances could have identified this issue; however, the Board found no evidence that 
SOS had performed any trend analysis of nonconthrthances, 
Recommendation (RC4-1): SGS should develop a mechanism to ensure that OSHA 
noncompliances immediately dangerous to life and health are reported to the subcontractor 
president/top management. 
Other prime contractors (e.g., USA and Boeing) should develop a similar 
mechanism to ensure that OSHA noncompliances immediately dangerous to life 
and health are reported to the subcontractor president/top management. 
For construction contracts that NASA/KSC issues, NASA/KSC should develop a 
similar mechanism to ensure that OSHA noncompliances immediately dangerous 
to life and health are reported to the contractor president/top management.
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Recommendation (RC4-2): Prime contractor safety specialists should trend noncompliances 
and discuss them at the appropriate contractor/subcontractor safety meeting. 
Recommendation (RC4-3): For construction contracts that NASAIKSC issues, NASAJKSC 
should trend noncomplianceS and discuss them at the appropriate contractor safety meeting. 
	
4.2.5	 Root Cause 5; NASA/KSC fall protection practices follow the OSHA-defined 
standards for low-sloped roofs, which allow the Warning Line and Safety 
Monitoring System rather than requiring a physical-restraint system. (RCS) 
Background: Although allowed by OSHA for low-sloped roofing work, the Warning Line and 
Safety Monitoring System has no physical means of limiting a fall. While a physical-restraint 
system will not necessarily eliminate all injuries, if properly used, it will eliminate the human 
error associated with using a Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System. 
Recommendation (RC5-1): NASAJKSC should develop and implement a fall protection policy 
and program for low-sloped roofing work that is more stringent than the OSFIA standard and 
requires the use of physical restraints when working within 6 ft of the edge. The use of warning 
lines and safety monitors or other nonphysical-restraint systems should be reserved for special 
circumstances after review and approval through a NASAJKSC formalized variance process. 
Recommendation (RC5-2): A Centerwide fall protection team (civil servants and contractors) 
should be formed to examine issues (e.g., standardization across contractors, variance 
processing, retrofitting of existing facilities) arising from the implementation of a new, more 
stringent fall protection policy and program. 
	
4.3	 Contributing Factors 
Several factors were found to contribute to the events and conditions that led to the Building 
1\46-794 roofing fatality. These contributing factors, along with recommendations, are given in 
4,3.1 through 4.3.4. 
4.3.1	 Superintendent helped move the rooting panel while acting as the safety monitor 
(CoF1) 
Background: The Oneida superintendent was acting as the safety monitor, a function with the 
following OSHA responsibilities: (1) the safety monitor shall be competent to recognize fall 
hazards; (2) the safety monitor shall warn the employee when it appears that the employee is 
unaware of a fall hazard or is acting in an unsafe manner; (3) the safety monitor shall be 00 the 
same walking/working surface and within visual sighting distance of the employee being 
monitored; (4) the safety monitor shall be close enough to communicate orally with the 
employee; and (5) the safety monitor shall not have other responsibilities that could take the 
monitor's attention from the monitoring function (emphasis added). However, the superintendent 
physically assisted the workers by helping them move the roofing panel, while acting as the 
safety monitor. 
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Note: This contributing factor was analyzed further and the result led to Root Causes 3 and 4. 
See 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. 
	
4.3.2	 Superinten(lent did not stop the job and seek additional personnel when two 
workers were not sufficient (CoF2) 
Background: While replacing two other panels earlier that day on the same roof, the 
superintendent recognized a hazard to the fingers of the person lifting the leading edge of the 
adjacent sheet metal. As the workers slid the new sheet underneath the adjacent sheet while 
holding the edge up, their fingers were being pinched. By having a third person hold up the edge 
of the adjacent sheet, the pinch point hazard was eliminated. The superintendent did not stop the 
job and seek additional personnel to help with the third roofing panel when two workers were not 
sufficient. Instead of keeping himself free of other functions to act as safety monitor, or stopping 
the job and seeking additional personnel, he assisted the workers with their task. The Board 
concluded that the superintendent performed his duties improperly by not stopping the job and 
seeking additional personnel when two workers were not sufficient. 
Recommendation (CoF2.1): Prime contractors should investigate providing incentives to 
subcontractors for safe work; similar to how NASAJKSC provides monetary award for safety 
performance to its construction contractors. 
	
4.3.3	 Temporary anchorage points were not required by OSHA, NASA, KSC or 
contractors (C0F3) 
Background: There is no evidence that temporary anchorage points, which could have been 
provided by Oneida, were ever considered prior to the roofing job commencing. In fact, the 
Oneida safety plan, which permitted the use of the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System, 
was properly submitted and approved by SGS Safety, Health, and Training in accordance with 
SOS OSEI-P-0215, Construction and Service Subcontractor Safety Program, and as written, 
complied with OSHA, NASA, KSC, and contractor safety requirements for low-sloped roofing 
work. It should be noted that after the mishap, a temporary fall protection system (life lines) was 
installed to allow the roofing job to be completed. 
Recommendation (CoF3-1): A Cetiterwide fall protection team (civil servants and contractors) 
should be formed to examine issues (e.g., use of temporary anchorage points, standardization 
across contractors, variance processing, retrofitting of existing facilities) arising from the 
implementation of a fall protection policy and progfam. 
4.3.4	 While not legally intoxicated tinder Florida's Driving Standard, the deceased 
was under the influence of alcohol and tested positive for marijuana (CoF4) 
Background: The deceased was impaired at the time of the mishap since he tested positive for 
the presence of alcohol and tetrahydrocannabinol (TI-IC), a marijuana metabolite. Physical 
impairment of the deceased by drugs or alcohol could have increased the likelihood of his 
tripping, stumbling, or losing his balance; or upon tripping, stumbling, or losing his balance, 
being less able to regain his b:dance. The regulations as written in the NASA Drug Free 
Workplace Program (NPR 3792.IA, NASA Plan for a Drug-Free Workplace, for civil servants; 
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and the NASA FAR supplement section on Drug-Free Workplace for contractors) did not require 
drug or alcohol testing for the individuals involved in this mishap, either as a part of random 
screening or postmishap. 
Recommendation (CoF44): NASA Headquarters should evaluate the requirements of the 
NASA Drug-Free Work Place Program and the NASA FAR Supplement, section on Drug-Free, 
Workplace for contractors, to determine whether they are adequate to protect the civil-service 
and contractor workforce. 
4.4	 Failed Barriers 
The Board found one failed barrier associated with the Building M6-794 roofing fatality. This 
failed barrier is discussed in 4.4.1. 
4.4.1	 Superintendent did not use the Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System 
correctly (FBi) 
Background: The Warning Line and Safety Monitoring System, which was permitted by OSHA 
29 CFR 1926.501(b)(10) for work on low-sloped roofs, was not properly implemented by the 
Oneida superintendent. Two OSHA violations occurred because the superintendent (I) did not 
use a warning line and (2) helped the Oneida workers carry the roofing panel, while acting as the 
safety monitor. 
Recommendation: See Recommendation RC5-1. 
4.5	 Other Significant Observations and Recommendations 
Training and Documentation 
	
4.5.1	 Oneida did not maintain a current list of employees who were working on the 
job site (01) 
RecomrnendatiO (01-1): SOS should ensure that its subcontractors maintain a current list of 
all employees working on the job site. 
•	
Employee lists should be kept at job sites for review by SOS. Subcontractor site 
supervisors should update employee lists as new employees come onto ajob site. 
•	
Subcontractor should verify current training records and/or certifications for each 
employee on this list. 
	
4.5.2	 Oneida did not conduct, or did not document, all weekly safety meetings (02) 
Recommendation (02-1): SGS should ensure that subcontractor site superintendents comply 
with safety meeting and documentation requirements as set forth in their contracts. 
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4.5.3	 Oneida provided no evidence that either the deceased or the other Oneida 
worker was trained by a competent person qualified in 29 CPR 1926, Subpart 
M, Fall Protection. Therefore, the training of the deceased and the other Oneida 
worker was deficient (03) 
Recommendation (03-1): SGS should ensure that Oneida retrains all its employees who 
perform work for KSC in required elements of fall protection. Proof of training by a competent 
and qualified person should be provided. 
Recommendation (03-2): A Centerwide fallprotection team should develop minimum 
standards or elements of fall protection traimling for use by KSC construction contractors and 
subcontractors as they develop their training requirements. 
	
4.5.4	 The training certification provided by Oneida was not signed by the trainer or 
the employer, so it was in technical violation of 29 CFR 1926.503(b)(1) (04) 
Recommendation (04-1):SGS should evaluate methods of enforcing the 29 CFR 
1926.503(b)( 1) 
 requirement for its subcontractors. 
	
4.5.5	 While KSC fall protection training was, for the most part, adequate for 
construction workers, it was insufficient for specialized training for competent 
or qualified persons and inspector training (05) 
Background: As part of its request to evaluate fall protection in general at KSC, the Board 
reviewed the fall protection training given at KSC by SGS, USA, and Boeing. According to the 
Gravitec Systems Inc. Fall Hazard Survey, Final Report, October 2005, "The current level of 
training at KSC is limited to four hours of information. None of the training programs through 
USA, InDyne, Boeing, and NASA are more than four hours. These four hours may be high 
quality, however it is not possible to cover basic requirements of fall protection training in this 
amount of time." 
Recommendation (05-1): A Centerwide fall protection team should evaluate KSC fall 
protection training programs to ensure that training is appropriate and adequate to train personnel 
to he "competent and qualified" as defined in 29 CFR 1926.32. 
Communications 
	
4.5.6	 Contractors and subcontractors were not required to inform NASA of all on-
Center worksite OSHA noncompliances (06) 
Recommendation (06 .1): NASA/KSC should determine if the existing policy, which does not 
require NASAIKSC to he informed of all worksite safety noncompliances, is adequate. 
	
4.5.7	 Inadequate coordination within SGS resulted in Oneida working without the 
knowledge of SGS Safety (07) 
Recommendation (07-1): SGS should ensure proper coordination among all elements of SOS 
and subcontractors prior to start of work (i.e., before permission to return to work is granted to
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subcontractors, confirmation should be obtained from each SGS organization required to monitor 
subcontractor performance). 
Fall Policy 
4.5.8	 Permanent anchorage points were not added anytime after the initial 
construction of Building M6-794, and KSC policy did not require their 
installation (08) 
Neither permanent nor temporary anchorage points were available or made available on Building 
M6-794 at the time of the mishap. The Board determined that permanent anchorage points were 
not part of the original 1964 design of M6-794. Since that time, permanent anchors were not 
added, and KSC policy did not require their installation. 
Recommendation (08-1): A Centerwide fall protection team (civil servants and contractors) 
should consider the policy of adding permanent anchorage points on new construction projects at 
KSC and retrofitting existing facility roofs with permanent fall protection systems based on a 
hierarchy of need (e.g., roof access frequency, presented hazards). 
	
4.5.9	 Other than OSIIA minimum stanclards,flo single, standardized fall protection

policy exist.s across all NASA Centers or operating locations (09) 
Recommendation (09-1): NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) should 
take the lead in convening an inter-Center team of safety and fall protection experts to make 
recommendations concerning a uniform fall protection policy for the Agency. 
Other 
	
4.5,10	 Drug and alcohol testing was not performed on Oneida workers involved in the 
mishap (010) 
Background: The regulations as written in the NASA Drug Free Workplace Program (NPR 
3792,1A, NASA Plan for a Drug-Free Workplace, for civil servants: and the NASA FAR 
supplement section on Drug-Free Workplace for contractors) did not require drug or alcohol 
testing for the individuals involved in this mishap, either as a part of random screening or 
postmishap. 
Recommendation (010-1): NASA Headquarters should revise the NASA Drug Free Work 
Place Program (NPR 3792.1A, NASA Plan for a Drug-Free Workplace, for civil servants; and 
the NASA FAR supplement section on Drug-Free Workplace for contractors) to include 
postmishap drug and alcohol testing for all contractor, subcontractor, and Government 
employees involved in Type A and Type B mishaps. 
Recommendation (010-2): The Center Safety Office should develop a checklist of activities for 
the Incident Response Team ([RT) to ensure all critical elements of a mishap investigation, 
including testing for drugs and alcohol in a Type A or Type B mishap, are accomplished. 
54
Mishap Report 
May 2036 
	
4.5.11	 Contract clause flowdown to the subcontractor was not a contributing factor to 
the mishap (011) 
Recommendation (011-1): None. The SOS Prime Contract NAS1O-99001 contained all 
pertinent safety clauses. The SOS safety clauses flowed down appropriately to the Oneida 
subcontract. Contract clause flowdown was not considered a contributing factor to the mishap. 
	
4.5.12	 Behaviors identified in mishaps can be used to study and improve the KSC 
safety culture (012) 
Background ,
 Some behaviors observed in this mishap may be similar to those in other recent 
mishaps at KSC. One isolated occurrence of a behavior may not reflect the safety culture, but 
consistent recurrences of similar behaviors may be stronger indications of systemic safety culture 
issues. Once identified, actions can then be taken to modify at-risk behaviors, which may 
indirectly change the culture of KSC and its subgroups. 
Recommendation (012 .1): A NASA/KSC team should identify a consistent method of 
categorizing behavioral contributing factors to mishaps, considering the various models used at 
KSC and in industry. This can be used for two purposes: 
Recent mishaps: Identify similar at-risk behaviors that led to recent mishaps and 
develop a plan to reduce these behaviors at KSC. This may have long-term effects 
on the KSC safety culture. 
Future mishaps: Use this method of categorizing behavioral contributing factors 
in future mishaps to improve trending and reduce al-risk behaviors. Ensure that 
future mishap boards consider cultural issues from the beginning by identifying 
how to include culture in mishap investigation reports. Define specifically what 
should and should not be included in mishap reports regarding culture.
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15. SOS Daily Construction & Services Subcontractor Checklist (Safety) for Oneida 
Subcontracts X04524-6, X05539, X00548, X00558, X04510, X04522, X05536, X05541, 
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APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply in tlie context of this document. 
barrier (failed barrier) 
physical device, intervention (e.g., a guardrail), or administrative control that can provide 
procedural separation in time and space (e.g., lock-out/tag-out procedure) to reduce the risk of an 
undesired outcome to an acceptable level 
Causal factor 
event or condition that results in an effect or that shapes or influences an outcome 
Competent person 
one who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or 
working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has 
authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them (29 CFR 1926.32(0) 
condition 
any as-found state, whether or not resulting from an event, that may have safety, health, quality, 
security, operational or environmental implications 
contributing factor 
event or condition that may have contributed to the occurrence of an undesired outcome but, if 
eliminated or modified, would not by itself have prevented the occurrence 
event 
real-time occurrence describing one discrete action, typically an error, failure, or malfunction 
(e.g., pipe broke, power lost, lightning struck, person opened valve) 
event and causal-factor tree 
visual representation of causal linkages, where the undesired outcome is at 
the top, flowing down through proximate causes and intermediate causes to root causes 
finding 
conclusion, positive or negative, based on facts established during the investigation by the 
investigating authority (e.g., cause, contributing factor, and observation) 
observation 
factor, event, or circumstance identified during the investigation that did not contribute to the 
mishap or close call, but if left uncorrected, has the potential to cause a mishap or increase the 
severity of a mishap; or factor, event, or circumstance that is positive and should be noted 
organizational factor 
any Operational or management structural entity that exerts control over the system at any stage 
in its life cycle, including but not limited to the system's concept development, design, 
fabrication, test, maintenance, operation, and disposal (e.g., resource management [budget, staff, 
training], policy [content, implementation, verification], and management decisions)
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proximate cause event that occurred or condition that existed immediately before the undesired outcome, directly 
resulted in the occurrence of the undesired outcome, and if eliminated or modified, would have 
prevented the undesired outcome 
qualified person one who, by possession of a recognized degree, certificate, or professional standing, or who by 
extensive knowledge, training, and experience, has successfullY demonstrated his ability to solve 
or resolve problems relating to the subject mater, the work, or the project (29 CFR 1926.32(m)) 
recommendation 
action developed by the investigation authority to correct a cause or a deficiency identified 
during the investigation 
root cause 
event, condition, or organizational factor that contributed to or created the proximate cause and 
subsequent undesired outcome, and if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome (typically multiple root causes contribute to an undesired outcome) 
warning line 
a barrier erected on roof to warn employees that they are approaching an unprotected roof side or 
edge and that designates an area in which roofing work may take place without the use of 
guardrail body belt, or safety net system 
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APPENDIX C. ABBREVIATIONS, A CRONYMS, AND SYMBOLS
ARC Ames Research Center 
BAC blood alcohol content 
CAD Computer-aided dispatch 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
CIJZ control decking zone 
FR Code of Federal Regulations 
1)FRC Dryden Flight Research Center 
E&CF events and causal factors 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
EST Eastern Standard Time 
F/R Fire/Rescue 
ft foot 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
]AT Incident Analysis Technique 
IRT Incident Response Team 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
m meter 
MAF Michoud Assembly Facility 
MORT Management Oversight Risk Tree 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ORMC Orlando Regional Medical Center 
OSHA Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
OSMA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
PAYI3 Patrick Air Force Base 
RFI Request for Information 
RIP Request for Proposal
ris 
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SGS Space Gateway Support 
SH&T Safety, Health & Training 
SSC Stennis Space Center 
THC tetrahydrocaflnabiflol 
WSFC White Sands Test Facility
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APPENDIX D. OSHA'S FORM 301 COMPLETED FOR THE 
BUILDING M6-794 ROOFING FATALITY
IA OSHA* Form 301 
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A PPENDIX E. INTERIM SAFETY ALERT 
From: Stamatelaos, Michael G. (HQ-G0000) Sent Wednesday, April 05, 2006 1:54 PM To: DL-HQ-OSMA-SMIR Cc: Oconncr, Bryan (HQ-GA000); Lloyd, James W. (JPL-343F)[JpLJ Subject: Safety Message - Fall Prevention
bear SMA Directors: 
As a reminder for mishap prevention, the President of the investigation board 
of the recent mishap in Florida, has asked that the message below be sent throughout the Agency. 
Best Iegards, 
Michael 
Fall Protection Alert "Safety Monitoring System" 
All Centers as part of their contractor oversight function are to insure that all 
prime and sub-contractors are following the OSHA requirements (or the 
Center's, if more restrictive) for fail protection. In particular, when working on 
a low slope roof or any similar structure at height (slope less than or equal to 
4:12, vertical rise: horizontal run) and using the safety monitoring 
system,"The safety monitor shall not have other responsibilities which could take the 
monitor's attention from the monitoring function" (OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502 (h) (1) (v)) 
Dr. Michael Stamatelatos, Director 
Safety and Assurance Iequirements Division
 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
NASA Headquarters 
300 E Street, SW 
Washington, bC 20546 
Phone: 202/358-1668 Fax: 202/358-3104
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APPENDIX F. EVENT & CAUSAL-FACTOR TREE RELEX) 
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